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1 Introduction
Financial firms’ investment choices are constrained by capital requirements and investment
guidelines, as well as risk–exposure and position limits. To assess the bindingness and the
cost of these constraints, so as to determine the corresponding constrained optimal investment
position, each financial firm must collect data from several trading desks and divisions, and
then aggregate these data. This is a difficult task, studied theoretically by Vayanos (2003),
who analyzes the challenges raised by the aggregation of risky positions within a financial firm
subject to communication constraints. These challenges have also been emphasized by several
regulators and consultants.1
Because data collection and aggregation is challenging, it takes time. For example, Ernst
& Young (2012, page 58) finds that “53% of [respondents in its study] aggregate counterparty
exposure across business lines by end of day, 27% report it takes two days, and 20% report
much longer processes.”2 This delays the incorporation of relevant information into investment
decisions, particularly in times of market stress.3
From a theoretical perspective, these stylized facts imply that financial firms’ traders make
decisions under preference uncertainty.4 That is, during the time it takes to reassess financial
and regulatory constraints, the traders in charge of implementing the optimal investment policy
of a firm are uncertain about the preferences of the latter. The goal of this paper is to examine
the consequences of such preference uncertainty for trading strategies, equilibrium pricing and
aggregate trading volume.
To do so, we focus on situations where the market is hit by an aggregate liquidity shock, in
1See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009) and Ernst & Young (2012, page 9): “Many firms
face challenges extracting and aggregating appropriate data from multiple siloed systems, which translate into
fragmented management information on the degree of risk facing the organization.”Ernst & Young (2012, page
20), however, also notes that financial firms use these data to assess their risk appetite and that “close to half
[the respondents] (49%) report that stress testing results are significantly incorporated into risk management
decision making.”
2See also Ernst & Young (2012, page 76): “The most prominent challenge is the sheer amount of time it
takes to conduct stress testing [via] what is often a manual process of conducting test and gathering results
across portfolios and businesses.” Similarly, the Institute for International Finance (2011, page 50) mentions,
some of the respondents to its study “say that their process lacks the capability to produce near-real-time and
real-time reports on exposure and limit usage.”
3As noted by Mehta et al. (2012, page 7): “Most banks calculate economic capital on a daily (30%) or weekly
(40%) basis, actively using it for risk steering and definition of limits in accordance with the risk appetite.”See
also Mehta et al. (2012, page 5): “Across all banks, the survey found that average Value-at-Risk run time ranges
between 2 and 15 hours; in stressed environments, it can take much longer”.
4By “preference uncertainty” we mean that traders view the utility function of their institution as a random
variable, but we don’t use the word “uncertainty” in the Knightian sense.
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which firms’ willingness and ability to hold assets is reduced, due, e.g., to losses (Berndt et al.,
2005), increased risk, asset downgrades or index changes (Greenwood, 2005), or margin calls
and fund outflows (Coval and Stafford, 2007). As mentioned above, it is in such times of stress
that preference uncertainty is likely to be most severe. To cope with the shock, financial firms
establish hedges, raise new capital, and adjust positions in several assets and contracts. This
process is complex, and involves transactions conducted by different desks in different markets.
It takes time to complete it and also, as discussed above, to collect, process and disseminate
the corresponding information to all traders in the firm.
To model this situation, we consider an infinite-horizon, continuous-time market for one
particular asset. There is a continuum of infinitely lived, risk–neutral and competitive financial
firms who derive a non–linear utility flow, denoted by v(θ, q), from holding q divisible shares of
this asset, as in Gaˆrleanu (2009) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009). At the time of the liquidity
shock, the utility flow parameter drops to θ` for some of the firms, as in Weill (2004, 2007) and
Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2007). This drop in utility flow reflects the increase in capital
charges and the additional regulatory costs of holding the asset induced by the liquidity shock.
Then, as time goes by, the firms hit by the shock progressively switch back to a high valuation,
θh > θ`. This switch occurs when a firm has successfully established the hedges and adjustments
in capital and position necessary to absorb the liquidity shock and correspondingly recover a
high valuation for the asset. To model this we assume each firm is associated with a Poisson
process and switches back to high-valuation at the first jump in this process. Furthermore, to
model preference uncertainty we assume each firm is represented in the market by a trader who
observes her firm’s current valuation for the asset, θ, at Poisson distributed “updating times.”
Each firm is thus exposed to two Poisson processes: one jumps with its valuation for the asset,
and the other jumps when its trader observes updated information about that valuation. For
tractability, we assume that these processes are independent and independent across firms.
In this context, a trader does not continuously observe the utility flow generated for her
firm by the position she takes. She, however, designs and implements the trading strategy
that is optimal for the firm, given her information. Thus, when a trader observes updated
information about the preferences of her firm, she designs a new trading plan, specifying the
process of her asset holdings until the next information update, based on rational expectations
about future variables and decisions. At each point time, the corresponding demand from a
trader is increasing in the probability that her firm has high valuation. Substituting demands
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in the market clearing condition gives rise to equilibrium prices. We show equilibrium existence
and uniqueness. By the law of large numbers, the cross–sectional aggregate distribution of
preferences, information sets and demands is deterministic, and so is the equilibrium price.5
Unconstrained efficiency would require that low-valuation traders sell to high-valuation
traders. However, such asset reallocation is delayed by preference uncertainty. Some traders
hold more shares than they would if they knew the exact current status of their firm, while oth-
ers hold less shares. Thus preference uncertainty generates allocative inefficiency. This does not
necessarily translate into lower prices, however. Indeed, preference uncertainty has two effects
on asset demand, going in opposite directions. On the one hand, demand increases because
traders who currently have low valuation don’t know it for sure and believe that they may have
a high valuation with positive probability. On the other hand, by the same token, demand
decreases because traders who currently have a high valuation believe that they may have a
low valuation with positive probability. If the utility function is such that demand is concave in
the probability that the firm has high valuation, the former effect dominates the latter, so that
preference uncertainty actually increases prices. The opposite holds if asset demand is convex
in this probability. We also analyze in closed form a specification where demand is neither
globally concave nor convex: in this case, we show that preference uncertainty may increase
prices when the liquidity shock hits, but subsequently lowers them as the shock subsides.
With known preferences, each trader observes the valuation of her firm, hence the cross–
sectional variance of valuation parameters is V [θ]. With preference uncertainty, traders don’t
observe the valuation of their firms. Instead they form expectations about it, conditional
on their information F . Hence the cross–sectional variance of valuations across traders is
V [E(θ | F)]. Since V [E(θ | F)] < V [θ], in a static model, preference uncertainty would lead to
lower trading volume, due to smaller dispersion of valuations. In our dynamic model, however,
the opposite occurs, because trades arise due to changes in expected valuations. Such changes
occur more often with preference uncertainty than with known preferences, which tends to
increase trading volume. More precisely, the economic mechanism underlying trades with pref-
erence uncertainty is the following: When traders observe their firm still has low valuation,
they sell a block of shares. Then, until the next updating time, they remain uncertain about
the exact valuation of their firm. They anticipate, however, that it is more and more likely
5In Biais, Hombert, and Weill (2012a), we analyzed an extension of our framework where the market is subject
to recurring aggregate liquidity shocks, occurring at Poisson arrival times. In Appendix B.5, we consider the
case when the number of traders is finite and the law of large numbers no longer applies. While, in both
extensions, the price becomes stochastic, the qualitative features of our equilibrium are upheld.
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that their firm has emerged from the shock. Correspondingly, under natural conditions, they
gradually buy back shares, which they may well sell back at their next updating time if they
learn their firm still has low valuation. This generates round trips, and larger trading volume
than when preferences are known. In some sense, preference uncertainty implies a taˆtonnement
process, by which the allocation of the asset progressively converges towards the efficient al-
location. Successive corrections in this taˆtonnement process generate excess volume relative
to the known preference case. When the frequency of information updates increases, the size
of the round trip trades decreases, but their number becomes larger. We show that, as the
frequency of information updates goes to infinity and preference uncertainty vanishes, the two
effects balance out exactly, so that the excess volume converges to some non-zero limit.
The condition under which preference uncertainty raises prices is related to the condition
under which it generates excess volume (more precisely the latter condition is necessary for the
former.) This is because the force that leads to increased prices is the demand coming from
traders who think their firm may have switched to high valuation, while in fact it still has low
valuation. It is precisely the same force that leads to the build–up of inventories, that are then
unwound via a block sale when the trader observes her firm still has low valuation. And it is
this inventory turnover which generates the round-trip trades that are at the origin of excess
volume.
A natural measure of the magnitude of the liquidity shock is the fraction of traders ini-
tially hit. As this fraction increases, the initial price drop generated by the shock increases,
and so does the total trading volume following the shock. Thus, one empirical implication of
our analysis is that, in a cross–section of liquidity shocks, the magnitude of the initial price
drop should be positively correlated with the total trading volume following the shock. Our
theoretical analysis also generates empirical implications for the cross–section of traders in a
given liquidity shock episode. In equilibrium, a trader whose institution recovers rapidly holds
large inventories, and makes only a few round trips. In contrast, a trader whose institution
recovers late in the cycle engages in many successive round trips. Correspondingly she holds
inventory during short periods of time. Furthermore, the traders whose institutions recover late
earn lower trading profits than those whose institutions recover early, since the latter buy early
(at low prices), while the former also buy late (at higher prices.) Thus, our theoretical analysis
implies negative correlation, among traders, between the number of round–trips and trading
profits, and also positive correlation between traders’ average inventories and trading profits.
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The latter correlation can be interpreted in terms of reward to liquidity supply: Traders with
low valuation sell the asset, thus demanding liquidity. Traders accommodating this demand
supply liquidity by buying the asset and holding inventories. Our implication reflects that such
liquidity supply is profitable.
Our assumption that institutions are unable to collect, process and disseminate all infor-
mation instantaneously is in the spirit of the rational inattention literature, which emphasizes
that economic agents have limited information processing ability (see, e.g., Lynch, 1996, Reis,
2006a, 2006b, Mankiw and Reis, 2002, Gabaix and Laibson, 2002, Alvarez, Lippi, and Paciello,
2011, Alvarez, Guiso, and Lippi, 2010.) Our analysis complements theirs by focusing on a dif-
ferent object: financial institutions and traders during liquidity shocks, and the corresponding
equilibrium prices and trading strategies.
Much of our formalism builds on search models of over-the-counter (OTC) markets, such
as those of Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005), Weill (2007), Gaˆrleanu (2009), Lagos and
Rocheteau (2009), Lagos, Rocheteau, and Weill (2011), and Pagnotta and Philippon (2011).
In particular, we follow these models in assuming that investors’ valuations change randomly.
Also, the friction we consider (infrequent observation of types) is, in some sense, comparable to
that they study (infrequent contact with markets). That being said, the market structure we
consider (centralized, continuous, limit order markets), is very different from the fragmented
dealer market structure they consider. Correspondingly, what happens between times at which
our traders observe their valuation differs from what happens in search models of OTC markets
between times at which traders contact the market. During this time interval, in our approach,
traders engage in active trading strategies, while they must stay put in models of OTC markets.
This, in turn, leads to a qualitative difference in implications: In our analysis, the friction leads
to excess–volume with respect to the frictionless market. In contrast, in the above models of
OTC markets, an increase in the magnitude of the friction reduces trading volume.
One of the major implications of our theoretical analysis is that each trader will generally
engage in several consecutive round–trips. The round–trips arising in our centralized limit
order market are different, however, from those arising in dealer markets.6 Dealers aim, after a
sequence of round–trip trades, to hold zero net inventory position. And, in turning over their
6They also differ from those arising in fragmented OTC markets such as those analyzed by Afonso and Lagos
(2011), Atkeson, Eisfeldt, and Weill (2012) and Babus and Kondor (2012). In these models, excess volume arises
because all trades are bilateral, which give investors incentives to provide immediacy to each other, buying from
those with lower valuation than them, and then selling to those with higher valuation. In our model, excess
volume arises even though all trades occur in a centralized market.
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position, they earn the realized bid–ask spread. This logic, underlying Grossman and Miller
(1988), stands in contrast with the economic mechanism prevailing in our model where there
are no designated dealers and round-trips are not motivated by the desire to move back to an
ideal zero net position or to earn the bid-ask spread.
Round–trips can also arise when potentially informed investors buy, driving the price up,
and then re-sell, before the price eventually reverts (see for instance Allen and Gale, 1992,
Brunnermeier, 2005). Our model has different implications in at least two dimensions: First,
the investors who engage in round–trips eventually hold the asset. Second, the price continues
to go up after the round–trip trade, i.e., there is no overshooting.
Gromb and Vayanos (2002, 2010) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) also study liquidity
shocks in markets with frictions. But the frictions they consider differ from ours. They consider
traders’ funding constraints, while we consider information processing constraints. In contrast
with these papers, in our framework frictions don’t necessarily amplify the initial price drop.
And they can also increase trading volume.
The consequences of the informational frictions in our analysis vastly differ from those
of asymmetric information on common values. When traders observe private information on
the common value of the asset, this creates a “speculative” motive for trade. With rational
traders, however, this does not increase trading volume, but reduces it. This is because private
information induces adverse selection, making traders reluctant to trade, as in Akerlof (1970).7
The next section presents our model. Section 3 presents the equilibrum. The implications of
our analysis are outlined in Section 4. Section 5 briefly concludes. The main proofs are in the
appendix. A supplementary appendix collects the proofs omitted in the paper. It also discusses
a model in which institutions choose their information collection effort as well as what happens
with a finite number of traders.
7See Appendix B.3 for a formal argument. Of course the effect of adverse selection disappears if uninformed
traders are noise traders. Noise traders do not optimize so, by assumption, never worry about adverse selection.
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2 Model
2.1 Assets and agents
Time is continuous and runs forever. A probability space (Ω,F , P ) is fixed, as well as an
information filtration satisfying the usual conditions (Protter, 1990).8 There is an asset in
positive supply s > 0 exchanged in a centralized continuous market. The economy is populated
by a [0, 1]-continuum of infinitely-lived financial firms (banks, funds, insurers, etc...) discounting
the future at the same rate r > 0.
Financial firms can either be in a high valuation state, θh, or in a low valuation state, θ`.
The firm’s utility flow from holding q units of the asset in state θ ∈ {θ`, θh} is denoted by
v(θ, q), and satisfies the following conditions. First, utilities are strictly increasing and strictly
concave in q, and they satisfy
vq(θ`, q) < vq(θh, q),
for all q > 0. That is, low-valuation firms have lower marginal utility than high-valuation firms
and, correspondingly, demand less assets. Second, in order to apply differential arguments, we
assume that, for both θ ∈ {θ`, θh}, v(θ, q) is three times continuously differentiable in q > 0
and satisfies the Inada conditions vq(θ, 0) = +∞ and vq(θ,∞) = 0. Finally, firms can produce
(or consume) a non-storable nume´raire good at constant marginal cost (utility) normalized to
1.
2.2 Liquidity shock
To model liquidity shocks we follow Weill (2004, 2007) and Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen
(2007). All financial firms are ex-ante identical: before the shock, each firm is in the high–
valuation state, θ = θh, and holds s shares of the asset. At time zero, the liquidity shock
hits a fraction 1 − µh,0 of financial firms, who make a switch to low–valuation, θ = θ`. The
switch from θ = θh to θ = θ` induces a drop in utility flow, reflecting the increase in capital
charges and additional regulatory costs of holding the asset induced by the liquidity shock.
The shock, however, is transient. In practice firms can respond to liquidity shocks by hedging
their positions, adjusting them, and raising capital. Once they have completed this process
8To simplify the exposition, for most stated equalities or inequalities between stochastic processes, we sup-
press the “almost surely” qualifier as well as the corresponding product measure over times and events.
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Figure 1: The measure of high-valuation institutions (plain
green) and the asset supply (dashed red).
successfully, they recover from the shock and switch back to a high valuation for the asset. To
model this, we assume that, for each firm, there is a random time at which it reverts to the
high–valuation state, θ = θh, and then remains there forever. For simplicity, we assume that
recovery times are exponentially distributed, with parameter γ, and independent across firms.
Denote by µh,t the fraction of financial firms with high valuation at time t. By the law of large
numbers, the flow of firms who become high valuation at time t is equal to9 µ′h,t = γ
(
1− µh,t
)
,
implying that:
1− µh,t =
(
1− µh,0
)
e−γt, (1)
as illustrated in Figure 1. Because there is no aggregate uncertainty, in all what follow we
will focus on equilibria in which aggregate outcomes (price, allocation, etc...) are deterministic
functions of time.
2.3 Preference uncertainty
Each financial firm is represented in the market by one trader. As discussed above, the process
by which the firm recovers from the liquidity shock is complex and costly. As a result, it takes
time to collect all the data about this process, analyze the information and disseminate it to
the traders. Correspondingly, we assume a trader does not observe the preference parameter
θ of her firm in continuous time. We assume instead that, for each trader, there is a counting
process, Nt, such that she updates her information about θ at each jump of Nt. For simplicity,
we assume that traders’ updating times are Poisson distributed with intensity ρ, independent
9For simplicity and brevity, we do not formally prove how the law of large numbers applies to our context.
To establish the result precisely, one would have to follow Sun (2006), who relies on constructing an appropriate
measure for the product of the agent space and the event space.
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from each other and from everything else.10
2.4 Holding plans and intertemporal utilities
When a trader observes the current value of her θ at some time t > 0, she designs a new asset
holding plan, qt,u, for all subsequent times u ≥ t until her next updating time, at which point
she designs a new holding plan, and so on. Each holding plan is implemented, in our centralized
market, by the placement and updating of sequences of limit orders. At each point in time, the
collection of the current limit orders of a trader determines her demand function.
Formally, letting T = {(t, u) ∈ R2+ : t ≤ u}, the collection of asset holding plans is a
stochastic process
q : T × Ω→ R+
(t, u, ω) 7→ qt,u(ω),
which is adapted with respect to the filtration generated by θt and Nt. That is, a trader’s
asset holdings at time u can only depend on the information she received until time t, her last
updating time: the history of her updating and valuation processes up to time t. Note that,
given that there is no aggregate uncertainty and given our focus on equilibria with deterministic
aggregate outcomes, we do not need to make the holding plan contingent on any aggregate
information such as, e.g., the market price, since the later is a deterministic function of u.
We impose, in addition, mild technical conditions ensuring that intertemporal values and costs
of the holding plan are well defined: we assume that a trader must choose holding plans
which are bounded, have bounded variation with respect to u for any t, and which generate
absolutely integrable discounted utility flows. In all what follow, we will say that a holding
plan is admissible if it satisfies these measurability and regularity conditions.
Now consider a trader’s intertemporal utility. For any time u ≥ 0, let τu denote the last
updating time before u, with the convention that τu = 0 if there has been no updating on θ
since time zero. Note that τu has an atom of mass e
−ρu at τu = 0, and a density ρe−ρ(u−t)
for t ∈ (0, u].11 At time u, the trader follows the plan she designed at time τu, so she holds a
10To simplify notations, we don’t index the updating time processes of the different traders by subscripts
specific to each trader. Rather we use the same generic notation, “Nt”, for all traders.
11To see this, note that for any t ∈ [0, u], the probability that τu ≤ t is equal to the probability that there
has been no updating time during (t, u], i.e., to the probability of the event Nu − Nt = 0. Since the counting
process for updating times follows a Poisson distribution, this probability is equal to e−ρ(u−t).
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quantity qτu,u of assets. Thus, the trader’s ex ante intertemporal utility can be written:
V (q) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−ruv(θu, qτu,u) du
]
, (2)
where the expectation is taken over θu and τu. Next, consider the intertemporal cost of buying
and selling assets. During [u, u + du], the trader follows the plan chosen at time τu, which
prescribes that her holdings must change by dqτu,u. Denoting the price at time u by pu, the
cost of buying of selling asset during [u, u + du] is, then, pu dqτu,u. Therefore, the ex-ante
intertemporal cost of buying and selling assets writes
C(q) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rupudqτu,u
]
, (3)
which is well defined under natural regularity conditions about pu.
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2.5 Market clearing
The market clearing condition requires that, at each date u ≥ 0, aggregate asset holdings be
equal to s, the asset supply. In our mass–one continuum setting, aggregate asset holdings are
equal to the cross–sectional average asset holding. Moreover, by the law of large numbers,
and given ex–ante identical traders, the cross-sectional average asset holding is equal to the
expected asset holding of a representative trader. Hence, the market clearing condition at time
u can be written:
E
[
qτu,u
]
= s (4)
for all u ≥ 0, where the expectation is taken with respect to τu and to θτu , reflecting the
aggregation of asset demands over a population of traders with heterogeneous updating times
and uncertain preferences.
3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is made up of an admissible holding plan q and of a price path p such that: i)
given the price path p the holding plan q maximizes the intertemporal net utility V (q)−C(q),
where V (q) and C(q) are given by (2) and (3) and ii) the optimal holding plan is such that
12For example, it will be well defined in the equilibrium we study, where pu is deterministic and continuous.
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the market clearing condition (4) holds at all times. In this subsection we characterize the
demands of traders for any given price path and then, substituting demands in the market–
clearing condition, we show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. We conclude the section
by establishing that this equilibrium is socially optimal.
3.1 Asset demands
Focusing on equilibria in which the price path is deterministic, bounded, and continuously
differentiable,13 we define the holding cost of the asset at time u:
ξu = rpu − p˙u, (5)
which is equal to the cost of buying a share of the asset at time u and reselling it at u + du,
i.e., the time value of money, rpu, minus the capital gain, p˙u.
Lemma 1. A trader’s intertemporal net utility can be written:
V (q)− C(q) = p0s+ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−ru
{
E
[
v(θu, qτu,u)
∣∣Fτu]− ξuqτu,u} du] . (6)
At time τu, her most recent updating time before time u, the trader received information
θτu about her valuation, and she chose the holding plan qτu,u. Thus, she expects to derive
utility E
[
v(θu, qτu,u)
∣∣Fτu] at time u, and to incur the opportunity cost ξuqτu,u.
Lemma 1 implies that an optimal holding plan can be found via optimization at each
information set. Formally, a trader’s optimal asset holding at time u solves:
qτu,u = arg max
q
E
[
v(θu, q)
∣∣Fτu]− ξuq.
Let piτu,u denote the probability that θu = θh given the value of θτu observed at t. The trader’s
problem can be rewritten as
qτu,u = arg max
q
piτu,uv(θh, q) + (1− piτu,u) v(θ`, q)− ξuq,
13As argued above, deterministic price paths are natural given the absence of aggregate uncertainty. Further,
in the environment that we consider, one can show that the equilibrium price must be continuous (see Biais,
Hombert, and Weill, 2012b). The economic intuition is as follows. If the price jumps at time t, all traders
who receive an updating opportunity shortly before t would want to “arbitrage” the jump: they would find it
optimal to buy an infinite quantity of assets and re-sell these assets just after the jump. This would contradict
market–clearing.
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so the first-order necessary and sufficient condition is:
piτu,uvq(θh, qτu,u) + (1− piτu,u)vq(θ`, qτu,u) = ξu. (7)
This equation means that each trader’s expected marginal utility of holding the asset during
[u, u + du] is equal to the opportunity cost of holding the asset during that infinitesimal time
interval. It implies the standard equilibrium condition that marginal utilities are equalized
across traders. Analyzing the first order condition (7), we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 2. There exists a unique solution to (7), which is a function of ξu and piτu,u only,
and which we correspondingly denote by D(pi, ξ). The function D(pi, ξ) is strictly increasing
in pi and strictly decreasing in ξ, is twice continuously differentiable in (pi, ξ), and it satisfies
limξ→0D(0, ξ) =∞ and limξ→∞D(1, ξ) = 0.
Note that a trader’s demand is increasing in the probability of being a high-valuation, pi.
This follows directly from the assumption that high-valuation traders have higher marginal
utility than low-valuation.
3.2 Existence and uniqueness
Consider some time u ≥ 0 and a trader whose most recent updating time is τu. If θτu = θh,
then the trader knows for sure that θu = θh and so she demands D(1, ξu) units of the asset at
time u. If θτu = θ`, then
piτu,u ≡
µh,u − µh,τu
1− µh,τu
, (8)
and her demand is D(piτu,u, ξu). Therefore, the market clearing condition (4) writes:
E
[
µh,τuD(1, ξu) +
(
1− µh,τu
)
D(piτu,u, ξu)
]
= s. (9)
The first term in the expectation represents the aggregate demand of high-valuation traders,
i.e., traders who discovered at their last updating time, τu, that their firm had a high valuation,
θτu = θh. Likewise, the second term represents the demand of low-valuation traders.
Note that aggregate demand, on the left-hand side of (9), inherits the properties of D(pi, ξ):
it is continuous in (pi, ξ), strictly decreasing in ξ, goes to infinity when ξ → 0, and to zero when
ξ →∞. Thus, this equation has a unique solution, ξu, which is easily shown to be a bounded
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and continuous function of time, u. The equilibrium price is obtained as the present discounted
value of future holding costs:
pt =
∫ ∞
t
e−r(u−t)ξu du.
While the holding cost ξu measures the cost of buying the asset at u net of the benefit of
reselling at u + du, the price pt measures the cost of buying at t and holding until the end of
time. Taking stock:
Proposition 1. There exists a unique equilibrium. The holding cost at time u is the unique
solution of (9), and is bounded and continuous. The asset holding of a time-τu high-valuation
trader is qh,u ≡ D(1, ξu), and the asset holding of a time-τu low-valuation trader is q`,τu,u ≡
D(piτu,u, ξu).
3.3 Constrained efficiency
To study constrained efficiency we define a collection of holding plans to be feasible if it is
admissible and if it satisfies the resource constraint, which is equivalent to the market-clearing
condition (4). Furthermore, we say that a collection of holding plans, q, Pareto dominates
some other collection of holding plans, q′, if it is possible to generate a Pareto improvement by
switching from q′ to q while making time zero transfers among investors. Because utilities are
quasi linear, q Pareto dominates q′ if and only if V (q) > V (q′).
Proposition 2. The holding plan arising in the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 is
the unique maximizer of V (q) among all feasible holding plans.
The proposition reflects that, in our setup, there are no externalities. To assess the robust-
ness of this welfare theorem, we consider (in supplementary appendix B.4) a simple variant of
the model, with three stages: ex-ante banks choose how much effort to exert, to increase the
precision of the information signal about their own type, interim banks receive their signal and
trade in a centralized market, ex-post banks discover their types and payoffs realize. In this
context, again, we find that the equilibrium is constrained Pareto efficient: both the choice of
effort and the allocation coincide with the one that a social planner would choose.
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4 Implications
4.1 Known preferences
To understand the implications of preference uncertainty, we first need to consider the bench-
mark in which traders continuously observe their valuation, θu. In that case, the last updating
time is equal to the current time, τu = u, and the market clearing condition (9) becomes:
µh,uD(1, ξ
?
u) +
(
1− µh,u
)
D(0, ξ?u) = s. (10)
Clearly, since µh,u is increasing and since D(1, ξ) > D(0, ξ) for all ξ, it must be the case that
both ξ?u and the price
p?t =
∫ ∞
t
e−r(u−t)ξ?u du,
increase over time. Correspondingly, demand of high- and low-valuation traders, given by
D(1, ξ?u) and D(0, ξ
?
u), must be decreasing over time.
The intuition is the following. High-valuation traders are more willing to hold the asset than
low-valuation traders. In a sense, the high-valuation traders absorb the asset that low-valuation
traders are not willing to hold, which can be interpreted as liquidity supply. As time goes by, the
mass of traders with high valuation goes up. Thus, the amount of asset each individual trader
of a given valuation needs to hold goes down. Correspondingly, traders’ marginal valuation for
the asset increases, and so does the price.
While this increase in price is perfectly predictable, it does not generate arbitrage oppor-
tunities. It just reflects the dynamics of the optimal allocation of the asset in a context where
traders’ willingness to hold the asset is finite. Such finite willingness to hold the asset can be
interpreted as a form of “limit to arbitrage.”While they know the price will for sure be higher
in the future, investors are not willing to buy more of it now, because that would entail an
opportunity cost of holding the asset (ξu) greater than their marginal valuation for the asset.
4.2 The impact of preference uncertainty on price
Let ξ?u be the opportunity cost of holding the asset when preferences are known. Starting
from this benchmark, what would be the effect of preference uncertainty? Would it raise asset
demand and asset prices?
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A global condition for higher demand and higher prices. Given any holding cost
ξ, preference uncertainty increases asset demand at time u, relative to the case of known
preferences, if and only if:
E
[
µh,τuD(1, ξ) + (1− µh,τu)D(piτu,u, ξ)
]
> µh,uD(1, ξ) + (1− µh,u)D(0, ξ). (11)
The left-hand side is the aggregate demand at time u under preference uncertainty, and the
right-hand side is the aggregate demand under known preferences. Using the definition of piτu,u,
this inequality can be rearranged into:
E
[ (
1− µh,τu
)
D(piτu , ξ)
]
> E
[
(1− µh,τu)
{
piτu,uD(1, ξ) + (1− piτu,u)D(0, ξ)
}]
. (12)
To interpret this inequality, note first that preference uncertainty has no impact on the demand
of high-valuation time-τu traders, because they know for sure that they will keep a high valu-
ation forever after τu. Thus, preference uncertainty only has an impact on the demand of the
measure 1 − µh,τu of time-τu low-valuation traders. The left-hand side of (12) is the time-u
demand of these time-τu low-valuation traders, under preference uncertainty. The right-hand
side is the demand of these same traders, but under known preferences.
Equation (12) reveals that preference uncertainty has two effects on asset demand, going in
opposite directions. With known preferences, a fraction piτu,u of time-τu low-valuation traders
would have known for sure that they had a high valuation at time u: preference uncertainty
decreases their demand, from D(1, ξ) to D(piτu,u, ξ). But the complementary fraction, 1−piτu,u,
would have known for sure that they had a low valuation at time u: preference uncertainty
increases their demand, from D(0, ξ) to D(piτu,u, ξ).
Clearly one sees that inequality (12) holds for all u and τu if demand D(pi, ξ) is strictly
concave in pi.
Proposition 3. If D(pi, ξ) is strictly concave in pi for all ξ, then the holding cost and the price
are strictly larger with preference uncertainty than with known preferences.
Concavity implies that, under preference uncertainty, the increase in demand of low-valuation
traders dominates the decrease for high-valuation traders.14 To illustrate the proposition, con-
14This result is in line with those previously derived by Gaˆrleanu (2009) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) in
the context of OTC markets. In these papers, traders face a form of preference uncertainty, because they are
uncertain about their stochastic utility flows in between two contact times with dealers. When OTC market
frictions increase, inter-contact times are larger, and so is preference uncertainty. In line with Proposition 3, in
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sider the iso-elastic utility:
v(θ, q) = θ
q1−σ − 1
1− σ , (13)
as in Lagos and Rocheteau (2009, Proposition 5 and 6). Then, after calculating demand, one
sees that preference uncertainty increases prices if σ > 1, and decreases prices when σ < 1.
Note that the global concavity condition of Proposition 3 does not hold in other cases of
interest. In particular, preferences in the spirit of Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005) tend to
generate demands that are locally convex for low pi and locally concave for high pi.15 To address
such cases, we now develop a less demanding local condition which applies when u ' 0, i.e.,
just after the liquidity shock, or for all u when ρ→∞, i.e., when traders face small preference
uncertainty.
A local condition for higher prices when u ' 0. Heuristically, just after the liquidity
shock, τu = 0 for most of the population, so we only need to study (12) for τu = 0. Moreover,
low-valuation traders only had a short time to switch to a high type, and so the probability
pi0,u is close to zero. Because pi0,u ' µ
′
h,0
1−µh,0 ×u ' 0 and demand is differentiable, we can make a
first-order Taylor expansion of (12) in pi0,u, and the condition for higher holding cost becomes:
Proposition 4. When u > 0 is small, time-u demand is larger under preference uncertainty,
and so is the equilibrium holding cost ξu if:
Dpi(0, ξ
?
0) > D(1, ξ
?
0)−D(0, ξ?0). (14)
where ξ?0 is the time-zero holding cost with known preferences.
The left-hand side of (14) represents the per-capita increase in demand for low types, and
the right-hand side the per-capita decrease in demand for high types. The proposition shows
that the holding cost is higher under preference uncertainty if: (i) Dpi(0, ξ) is large, i.e., low
Gaˆrleanu (2009) the friction does not affect asset prices, because the flow of utility is linear in asset holdings
and agent type. Also in line with Proposition 3, in Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) making the friction more severe
increases the price if the utility function is sufficiently concave.
15In Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005), preferences are of the form θmin{1, q}. Then, when ξ ∈ (θ`, θh),
demand is a step function of pi: it is zero when piθh+(1−pi)θ` < ξ, equal to [0, 1] when piθh+(1−pi)θ` = ξ, and
equal to one when piθh + (1− pi)θ` > ξ. With a smooth approximation of min{1, q}, demand becomes a smooth
approximation of this step function. It tends to be convex for small pi, rises rapidly when piθh + (1− pi)θ` ' ξ,
and becomes concave for large pi. In Section 4.4 below we offer a detailed study of equilibrium in a specification
where asset demands are neither globally concave nor convex in pi.
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types react very strongly to changes in their expected valuation and (ii) D(1, ξ) − D(0, ξ) is
bounded, i.e., high types do not demand too much relative to low types.
Note that the demand shift of low- and high valuations are driven by different considerations.
For the large population of low types, what matters is a change at the intensive margin: by how
much each low type changes its demand in response to a small change in expected valuation,
which is approximately equal to pi0,uDpi(0, ξ
?
0). For the small population of high types, on
the other hand, what matters is a change at the extensive margin: by how much demand
changes because a small fraction of high types turn into low types, which is approximately
equal to pi0,u [D(1, ξ)−D(0, ξ)]. This distinction will be especially important in our discussion
of trading volume, because we can have very large intensive margin changes even if holdings
are bounded.
A local condition for higher prices when ρ→∞. When ρ→∞, most traders had their
last updating time shortly before u, approximately at τu = u − 1ρ . This is intuitively similar
to the situation analyzed in the previous paragraph: when u ' 0, all traders had their last
updating time shortly before u as well, at τu = 0. Going through the same analysis, which can
be thought of heuristically as using piu− 1
ρ
,u instead of pi0,u, we arrive at:
Proposition 5. For all u > 0 and for ρ large enough, time-u demand is larger under preference
uncertainty, and so is the equilibrium holding cost if:
Dpi(0, ξ
?
u) > D(1, ξ
?
u)−D(0, ξ?u), (15)
where ξ?u is the time-u holding cost with known preferences. Moreover, the holding cost admits
the first-order approximation:
ξu(ρ) = ξ
?
u −
µ′h,u
ρ
Dpi(0, ξ
?
u)− [D(1, ξ?u)−D(0, ξ?u)]
µh,uDξ(1, ξ
?
u) +
(
1− µh,u
)
Dξ(0, ξ
?
u)
+ oα
(
1
ρ
)
,
where oα(1/ρ) is a function such that supu≥α |ρoα(1/ρ)| → 0 as ρ→∞, for any α > 0.
Condition (15) follows heuristically by replacing ξ?0 by ξ
?
u in condition (14). To interpret the
approximation formula, we first observe that, to a first-order approximation, the extra demand
at time u induced by preference uncertainty can be written:
µ′h,u
ρ
{
Dpi(0, ξ
?
u)−
[
D(1, ξ?u)−D(0, ξ?u)
]}
(16)
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by taking a first-order Taylor approximation of the difference between the left–hand–side and
the right–hand–side of (12), for τu ' u− 1ρ . Thus, the holding cost has to move by an amount
equal to this extra demand, in equation (16), divided by the negative of the slope of the demand
curve, µh,uDξ(1, ξ
?
u) + (1− µh,u)Dξ(0, ξ?u).
4.3 The impact of preference uncertainty on volume
We now turn from the effects of preference uncertainty on prices to its consequences for trading
volume. Does preference uncertainty increase or reduce volume? To study this question, we
focus on the case where preference uncertainty is least likely to affect volume, as the friction is
very small, i.e., it takes only a very short amount of time for traders to find out exactly what
the objective of the financial firm is. To do so, we study the limit of the trading volume as
ρ goes to infinity. One could expect that, as the friction vanishes, trading volume goes to its
frictionless counterpart. We will show, however, that it is not the case, and we will offer an
economic interpretation for that wedge
If the opportunity holding cost were equal to ξ∗u (which is the price prevailing in the bench-
mark case in which preferences are known) then traders’ holding plans would be:
q?`,t,u ≡ D(pit,u, ξ?u) and q?h,u ≡ D(1, ξ?u).
Thus, when low–valuation traders know their preferences with certainty, they hold q?`,u,u =
D(0, ξ∗u) at all times. With these notations, (twice) the instantaneous trading volume is:
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2V ? = µh,u
∣∣∣∣dq?h,udu
∣∣∣∣+ (1− µh,u) ∣∣∣∣dq?`,u,udu
∣∣∣∣+ µ′h,u ∣∣q?h,u − q?`,u,u∣∣ . (17)
The first and second terms account for the flow sale of high- and low-valuation traders. The
last term accounts for the lumpy purchases of the flow µ′h,u of traders who switch from low to
high valuation.
With preference uncertainty, (twice) the instantaneous trading volume is
2V = E
[
µh,τu
∣∣∣∣dqh,udu
∣∣∣∣+ (1− µh,τu) ∣∣∣∣∂q`,τu,u∂u
∣∣∣∣
+ ρ(1− µh,τu)
{
piτu,u |qh,u − q`,τu,u|+ (1− piτu,u) |q`,u,u − q`,τu,u|
}]
, (18)
16Equation (17) gives twice the volume because it double counts each trade as a sale and a purchase.
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where the expectation, taken over τu, reflects the aggregation of trades over a population of
agents with heterogeneous updating times.
The terms of the first line of equation (18) represent the flow trades of the traders who
do not update their holding plans. The partial derivative with respect to u,
∂q`,τu,u
∂u
, reflects
the fact that these traders follow a plan chosen at some earlier time, τu. In contrast, with
known preferences, traders update their holding plans continuously so the corresponding term
in equation (17) involves the total derivative,
dq?`,u,u
du
=
∂q?`,u,u
∂t
+
∂q?`,u,u
∂u
.
The terms on the second line of equation (18) represent the lumpy trades of the traders
who update their holding plans. There is a flow ρ
(
1− µh,τu
)
of time-τu low-valuation traders
who update their holding plans. Out of this flow, a fraction piτu,u find out that they have a
high valuation, and make a lumpy adjustment to their holdings equal to |qh,u − q`,τu,u|. The
complementary fraction 1− piτu,u find out they have a low valuation and make the adjustment
|q`,u,u − q`,τu,u|.
To compare the volume with known versus uncertain preferences, we consider the ρ → ∞
limit. As shown formally in the appendix, in order to evaluate this limit, we can replace qh,u
and q`,t,u by their limits q
?
h,u and q
?
`,t,u, and use the approximation τu ' u − 1ρ . After a little
algebra, we obtain that:
lim
ρ→∞
2V = 2V ∞ = µh,u
∣∣∣∣dq?h,udu
∣∣∣∣+ (1− µh,u) ∣∣∣∣∂q?`,u,u∂u
∣∣∣∣+ µ′h,u ∣∣q?h,u − q?`,u,u∣∣+ (1− µh,u) ∣∣∣∣∂q?`,u,u∂t
∣∣∣∣ .
Subtracting the volume with know preferences, 2V ?, we obtain:
2V ∞ − 2V ? = (1− µh,u){∣∣∣∣∂q?`,u,u∂t
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∂q?`,u,u∂u
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣dq?`,u,udu
∣∣∣∣} , (19)
which is positive by the triangle inequality, and strictly so if the partial derivatives are of
opposite sign.
To interpret these derivatives, note that under preference uncertainty, at time u some low-
valuation traders receive the bad news that they still have a low valuation while others receive
no news.
The traders who receive bad news at time u switch from the time-τu to the time-u holding
plan. When τu ' u − 1ρ , they change their holdings by an amount proportional to the partial
derivatives with respect to t,
∂q?`,u,u
∂t
< 0. This derivative is negative, implying that these traders
they sell upon receiving bad news.
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The traders who receive no news trade the amount prescribed by their time-τu holding
plan. When τu ' u − 1ρ , this changes their holding by an amount proportional to the partial
derivative with respect to u,
∂q?`,u,u
∂u
. Thus, when
∂q?`,u,u
∂u
> 0, traders with no news build up their
inventories.
Under preference uncertainty, the changes in holdings due to
∂q?`,u,u
∂t
and
∂q?`,u,u
∂u
contribute
separately to the trading volume, explaining the first two terms of (19). With known preferences,
in contrast, all low-valuation traders are continuously aware that they have a low-valuation,
and so their holdings change by an amount equal to the total derivative. This explains the last
term of (19).
In the time series, the above analysis implies that, when
∂q?`,u,u
∂u
> 0, low-valuation traders
engage in round-trip trades. Consider a trader who finds out at two consecutive updating
times, u and u + ε, that she has a low valuation. In between the two updating times, when ε
is small, she builds up inventories since
∂q?`,u,u
∂u
> 0. At the updating time u + ε, she receives
bad news, switches holding plan, and thus sells, since
∂q?`,u,u
∂t
< 0. Thus round trips arise only if
∂q?`,u,u
∂u
> 0. Correspondingly, the next proposition states that preference uncertainty generates
excess volume when ρ→∞ if and only if ∂q
?
`,u,u
∂u
> 0.
Proposition 6. As ρ→∞, the excess volume is equal to:
V ∞ − V ? = (1− µh,u)max{∂q?`,u,u∂u , 0
}
,
where
∂q?`,u,u
∂u
> 0 if and only if:
Dpi(0, ξ
?
u) > [D(1, ξ
?
u)−D(0, ξ?u)]
(1− µh,u)Dξ(0, ξ?u)
µh,uDξ(1, ξ
?
u) + (1− µh,u)Dξ(0, ξ?u)
. (20)
To understand why a trader may increase her holding shortly after an updating time, i.e.,
why
∂q?`,u,u
∂u
> 0, note that:
(1− µh,u)
∂q?`,u,u
∂u
=
(
1− µh,u
)
Dpi(0, ξ
?
u)
∂pit,u
∂u
+
(
1− µh,u
)
Dξ (0, ξ
?
u)
dξ?u
du
. (21)
The equation reveals two effects going in opposite directions. On the one hand, the first term
is positive, reflecting the fact that a low-valuation trader expects that she may switch to a
high-valuation, which increases her demand over time. On the other hand, the second term is
negative because the price increases over time and, correspondingly, decreases demand. If low-
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valuation traders’ demands are very sensitive to changes in expected valuation, then Dpi(0, ξ
?
u)
is large and preference uncertainty creates extra volume. A sufficient condition for this to be the
case is that demand is weakly concave with respect to pi. In the case of iso-elastic preferences,
(13), this arises if σ ≥ 1.
One sees that the condition (15) for preference uncertainty to increase demand is closely
related to condition (20) for it to create excess volume. This is natural given that both phe-
nomena can be traced back to low-valuation traders’ willingness to increase their holdings as
their probability of being high valuation increases. But the former condition turns out to be
stronger than the later: excess volume is necessary but not sufficient for higher demand.
4.4 An analytical example
To illustrate our results and derive further implications, we now consider the following analytical
example. We let s ∈ (0, 1), µh,0 < s, σ > 0 and we assume that preferences are given by:
v(θ, q) = m(q)− δI{θ=θ`}
m(q)1+σ
1 + σ
, (22)
for some δ ∈ (0, 1] and where
m(q) ≡
1−
ln
(
1+e1/ε[1−q
1−ε/(1−ε)]
)
ln(1+e1/ε)
if ε > 0
min{q, 1} if ε = 0.
When ε > 0 and is small, the function m(q) is approximately equal to min{q, 1},17 and it
satisfies the smoothness and Inada conditions of Section 2.1, so all the results derived so far
can be applied.
When ε = 0 the function m(q) is exactly equal to min{q, 1} and so it no longer satisfies these
regularity conditions. Nevertheless, existence and uniqueness can be established up to small
adjustments in the proof. Moreover, equilibrium objects are continuous in ε, in the following
sense:
Proposition 7. As ε → 0 the holding cost, holding plans and the asymptotic excess volume
converge pointwise to their ε = 0 counterparts.
17We follow Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) who use a closely related function to approximate a smooth but
almost frictionless matching process.
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This continuity result allows us to concentrate, for the remainder of this section, on the
ε = 0 equilibrium, which can be solved in closed form.
When ε = 0, the marginal valuation of a high-valuation trader is equal to one as long as q
is lower than 1, and equal to 0 for larger values of q. Hence, her demand is a step function of
the holding cost, ξ:
D(1, ξ) =

1 if ξ < 1
∈ [0, 1] if ξ = 1
0 if ξ > 1.
Also for ε = 0, the demand of a trader who expects to be of high valuation with probability
pi < 1 is:
D(pi, ξ) = min
{(
1− ξ
δ(1− pi)
) 1
σ
, 1
}
. (23)
When, ε = 0 and σ → 0, our specification nests the case analyzed in Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and
Pedersen (2005) and the demand of low-valuation traders is a step function of both the holding
cost and the probability pi of having a high-valuation.18 When σ > 0 our specification gener-
ates smoother demands for low-valuation traders, as with the iso-elastic specification (13) of
Lagos and Rocheteau (2009). Note however that when preferences are as in (13), demand is
either globally concave or convex in pi, so that preference uncertainty either always increases
or decreases prices. In contrast, for the specification we consider, in line with Duffie, Gaˆrleanu,
and Pedersen (2005), demands are neither globally concave nor convex in pi. Correspondingly,
we will show that preference uncertainty can increase prices in certain market conditions and
decrease prices in others.
The equilibrium holding cost is easily characterized. First, ξu ≤ 1 for otherwise aggregate
demand would be zero. Second, ξu = 1 if and only if u ≥ Tf , where Tf solves E
[
µh,τTf
]
= s.
In other words, ξu = 1 if and only if the measure of traders who know that they have a
high valuation, E
[
µh,τu
]
, is greater than the asset supply, s. In that case, high-valuation
traders absorb all the supply while holding qh,u ≤ 1, and therefore have a marginal utility
vq(θh, qh,u) = 1. Low-valuation traders, on the other hand, hold no asset. In this context
18See Addendum III in Biais, Hombert, and Weill (2012b) for a proof that the equilibrium is indeed continuous
at σ = 0: precisely, we show that, as σ → 0, equilibrium objects converges pointwise, almost everywhere, to
their σ = 0 counterparts.
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p = 1/r.
When u < Tf , then ξu < 1. All high-valuation traders hold one unit, and low-valuation
traders hold positive amounts. The holding cost, ξu, is the unique solution of:
E
[
µh,τu +
(
1− µh,τu
)
D(piτu,u, ξ)
]
= s. (24)
4.4.1 Known preferences
With known preferences, the above characterization can be applied by setting τu = u for all u.
In this case Tf is the time Ts solving µh,Ts = s. When u ≥ Ts:
q?h,u ∈ [0, 1], q?`,u,u = 0, and ξ?u = 1,
that is, all assets are held by high-valuation traders, the holding cost is 1 and the price is 1/r.
When u < Ts:
q?h,u = 1, q
?
`,u,u =
s− µh,u
1− µh,u
, and ξ?u = 1− δ
(
q?`,u,u
)σ
< 1.
In this case, there are µh,u high-valuation traders who each hold one share, and 1 − µh,u low-
valuation traders who hold the residual supply s − µh,u. The holding cost, ξ?u, is equal to
the marginal utility of a low-valuation trader and is less than one. Notice that the per-capita
holding of low-valuation traders, q?`,u,u, decreases over time. This reflects that, as time goes by,
more and more firms recover from the shock, switch to θ = θh and increase their holdings. As
a result, the remaining low–valuation traders are left with less shares to hold.
4.4.2 Holding plans
With preference uncertainty, we already know that qh,u = 1 for all u < Tf , qh,u ∈ [0, 1] and
q`,τu,u = 0 for all u ≥ Tf . The only thing left to derive are the holdings of low-valuation traders
when u < Tf .
Proposition 8. Suppose preferences are given by (22) and that ε = 0. When u < Tf , low
valuation traders hold q`,τu,u = min
{(
1− µh,τu
)1/σ
Qu, 1
}
, where Qu is a continuous function
such that Q0 =
s−µh,0
(1−µh,0)1+1/σ and QTf = 0. Moreover, Qu is a hump-shaped function of u if
condition (20) holds evaluated at u = 0, which, for the preferences given in (22) is equivalent
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to:
q`,0,0 = q
?
`,0,0 =
s− µh,0
1− µh,0
>
σ
1 + σ
, (25)
Otherwise Qu is strictly decreasing in u.
At time 0, all traders know their valuation for sure, so the allocation must be the same as
with known preferences. In particular, q`,0,0 = q
?
`,0,0 =
s−µh,0
1−µh,0 , which determines Q0. At time Tf
high–valuation traders absorb the entire supply. Hence, QTf = 0. For times u ∈ (0, Tf ), asset
holdings are obtained by scaling down Qu by (1− µh,τu)1/σ, where τu is the last updating time
of the trader. This follows because low-valuation traders have iso-elastic holding costs, so their
asset demands are homogenous. Correspondingly, if a low-valuation trader holds less than one
unit, qτu,u < 1, then, substituting (8) in (23) we have:
q`,τu,u = D(piτu,u, ξu) =
(
1− µh,τu
)1/σ
Qu, where Qu ≡
(
1− ξu
δ(1− µh,u)
)1/σ
.
Otherwise q`,τu,u = 1 <
(
1− µh,τu
)1/σ
Qu. If Qu is hump-shaped and achieves its maximum at
some time Tψ, then the holding plan of a trader with updating time τu ≤ Tψ will be hump-
shaped, and the holding plan of a trader with updating time τu > Tψ will be decreasing.
As shown in the previous section, (20) is the condition under which the holding plans of low
valuation traders are increasing with time, near time zero. If this condition holds at time 0, it
implies that holding plans defined at time 0 are hump–shaped. Because holdings plans at later
times are obtained by scaling down time–0 holding plans, they also are hump–shaped.
Finally, note that, with the preference specification (22), the demand of high-valuation
traders is inelastic when ξ?0 < 1, i.e., Dξ(1, ξ
?
0) = 0. This implies that the condition under which
preference uncertainty increases trading volume, (20), is equivalent to the simpler condition
under which it increases demand, (15).
The closed form expression for equation (25) reveals some natural comparative static. When
σ is small, (25) is more likely to hold. Indeed, utility is close to linear, Dpi(0, ξ
?
0) is large, and
traders’ demands are very sensitive to changes in the probability of being high valuation. When
s is large or when µh,0 is small, (25) is also more likely to hold. In that case the liquidity shock
is more severe. Hence, shortly after the initial aggregate shock, the inflow of traders who receive
good news is not large enough to absorb the sales of the traders who currently receive bad news.
In equilibrium, some of these sales are absorbed by traders who received the bad news at earlier
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Figure 2: The function Qu for various values of σ.
updating times, τu < u. Indeed, these “early” low–valuation traders anticipate that, as time
has gone by since their last updating time, τu < u, their valuation is more and more likely to
have reverted upwards piτu,u > 0. These traders find it optimal to buy if their utility is not too
concave, i.e., if σ is not too high. Correspondingly, their holding plan can be increasing, and
hence the function Qu is hump-shaped, as depicted in Figure 2 for σ = 0.5 and 1. But for the
larger value of σ = 5, the function Qu is decreasing (the parameter values used for this figure
are discussed in Section 4.4.5).
4.4.3 Trading volume
Proposition 8 provides a full characterization of the equilibrium holdings process, which can be
compared to its counterpart without preference uncertainty. Holdings with known preferences
are illustrated by the dash-dotted red curve in Figure 3: as long as a trader has not recovered
from the shock, her holdings decline smoothly, and, as soon as she recovers, her holdings jump
to 1. Holdings under preference uncertainty are quite different, as illustrated by the solid green
curve in Figure 3. Consider a trader who is hit by a liquidity shock at time zero. After time
zero, if (25) holds, the trader’s holding plan, illustrated by the dotted blue curve, progressively
buys back. If, at the next updating time, t2, the trader learns that her valuation is still low,
then she sells again. These round-trip trades continue until updating time t6 when the trader
finds out her valuation has recovered, at which point her holdings jump to 1. Thus, as we
argued before, while the friction we consider implies less frequent observations of preferences,
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it does not induce less frequent trading, quite to the contrary. The hump–shaped asset holding
plans shown in Figure 3 create round-trip trades and generate extra trading volume relative to
the known preference case.19
As we know, this extra volume persists even in the ρ → ∞ limit: although the round
trip trades of a low-valuation trader become smaller and smaller, they occur more and more
frequently. Note that, while the above analytical results on excess volume were obtained for the
asymptotic case where ρ goes to infinity, Figure 3 illustrates that, even for finite ρ, preference
uncertainty generates excess volume relative to the case where preferences are known.
Proposition 9. Suppose preferences are given by (22) and that ε = 0. Then the asymptotic
19As illustrated in Figure 3, both with known preferences and with preference uncertainty, the agent is
continuously trading. Transactions costs, as analyzed by Constantinides (1986), Dumas and Luciano (1991)
and Vayanos (1998), would reduce trading volume, as agents would wait until their positions get significantly
unbalanced before engaging in trades. We conjecture that equilibrium dynamics would remain similar to that
in Figure 3, except that holdings would be step functions. This would reduce the number of round–trips but
not altogether eliminate them.
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excess volume is equal to:
V ∞ − V ? = γ(1− µh,u) max
{
Dpi(0, ξ
?
u)−
[
D(1, ξ?u)−D(0, ξ?u)
]
, 0
}
= γmax
{
s− µh,u
σ
− (1− s), 0
}
.
The first equality involves, once again, the same terms as in condition (15): there is excess
volume if demand is sufficiently sensitive to changes in the probability of being high valuation.
The second equality yields comparative statics of excess volume with respect to exogenous
parameters. When σ decreases, demand becomes more sensitive to changes in the probability
of being high valuation, and volume increases. When γ increases, low-valuation traders expect
to change valuation faster, increase their demand by more, which increases excess volume.
4.4.4 Price
In the context of this analytical example we can go beyond the analysis of holding costs offered
in the general case, and discuss detailed properties of the equilibrium price:
Proposition 10. Suppose preferences are given by (22) and that ε = 0. Then, the price is
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing for u ∈ [0, Tf ), and constant equal to 1/r for
u ≥ Tf . Moreover:
• For u ∈ [Ts, Tf ), the price is strictly lower than with known preferences.
• For u ∈ [0, Ts], if (25) does not hold, then the price is strictly lower than with known
preferences. But if s is close to 1 and σ is close to 0, then at time 0 the price is strictly
higher than with known preferences.
This proposition complements our earlier asymptotic results in various ways. First it charac-
terizes the impact of preference uncertainty on price as opposed to holding cost; second, it offers
results about the price path when ρ is finite; and third, it links price impact to fundamental
parameters, such as s and σ.
The first bullet point follows because, from time Ts to time Tf , ξu < ξ
?
u = 1. But it is not
necessarily true for all u ∈ [0, Ts). When (25) does not hold, then low-valuation traders do not
create extra demand in between their updating times: to the contrary, they continue to sell
their assets, and in equilibrium the price is smaller than its counterpart with known preferences.
When (25) holds, then low-valuation traders increase their holdings in between updating times
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Table 1: Parameter values
Parameter Value
Discount rate r 0.05
Updating intensity ρ 250
Asset supply s 0.8
Initial mass µh,0 0.2
Recovery intensity γ 25
Utility cost δ 1
Curvature of utility flow σ {0.5, 1, 5}
and the price at time zero can be larger than its counterpart with known preferences. This
effect is stronger when low–valuation traders are marginal for a longer period, that is, when
the shock is more severe (s close to one) and when their utility flow is not too concave (σ close
to zero).
4.4.5 Empirical Implications
To illustrate numerically some key implications of the model, we select in Table 1 parameter
values to generate effects comparable to empirical observations about liquidity shocks in large
equity markets. Hendershott and Seasholes (2007) find liquidity price pressure effects of the
order of 10 to 20 basis points, with duration ranging from 5 to 20 days. During the liquidity
event described in Khandani and Lo (2008), the price pressure subsided in about 4 trading
days. Adopting the convention that there are 250 trading days per year, setting γ to 25 means
that an investor takes on average 10 days to switch back to high valuation. Setting the asset
supply to s = 0.8 and the initial mass of high-valuation traders to µh,0 = 0.2 then implies that
with continuous updating the time it takes the market to recover from the liquidity shock (as
proxied by Tf ) is approximately 15 days. For these parameter values, setting the discount rate
to r = 0.05 and the holding cost parameter to δ = 1 implies that the initial price pressure
generated by the liquidity shock is between 10 and 20 basis points.20 Finally, in line with the
survey evidence cited in the introduction, we set the updating intensity to ρ = 250, i.e., we
assume that each trader receives updated information about the utility flow she generates once
20Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2007) provide a numerical analysis of liquidity shocks in over–the–counter
markets. They choose parameters to match stylized facts from illiquid corporate bond markets. Because we
focus on more liquid electronic exchanges, we chose very different parameter values. For example in their
analysis the price takes one year to recover while in ours it takes less than two weeks. While the price impact of
the shock in our numerical example is relatively low, it would be larger for lower values of γ and r. For example
if r were 10% and the recovery time 20 days, then the initial price impact of the shock would go up from 13
to 60 basis points. Note however that, with non-negative utility flow, the initial price impact of the shock is
bounded above by 1− e−rT .
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Figure 4: The relationship between size of the shock, 1−µh,0,
and volume per unit of asset supply (left panel), between the
size of the shock and price drop in percent (middle panel), and
between price drop and volume (right panel), for known pref-
erences (dashed red curves) vs. uncertain preferences (plain
blue curves).
every day, on average.
Excess volume and liquidity shock. One of the main insights of our analysis is that
preference uncertainty generates round trip trades, which in turn lead to excess trading volume
after a liquidity shock. One natural measure of the size of the liquidity shock is the fraction of
traders initially hit, 1 − µh,0. The larger this fraction, the smaller µh,0 and hence µh,u at any
time u, and, by (26) in Proposition 9, the larger the excess volume. The left panel of Figure
4 illustrates this point by plotting total volume against initial price drop, for shocks of various
sizes (1− µh,0). As can be seen in the figure, the larger is 1− µh,0, the larger the total trading
volume.
The middle panel of Figure 4 shows that the initial price drop, at time 0, is also increasing in
the size of the liquidity shock. The right panel of Figure 4 illustrates these two points together
by plotting total volume against initial price drop, a relationship that is perhaps easier to
measure empirically. It shows that preference uncertainty generates a large elasticity of volume
to price drop. Consider for instance an increase of 1−µh0 from 0.6 to one. The left panel of the
figure indicates that the volume increases from 0.53 to 1.08, by about 105%. The price impact,
on the other hand, increases from 0.13 to 0.21 basis points, by about 65%. Taken together, the
elasticity of volume to price impact under preference uncertainty is around 1.6. As also shown
in the figure, the elasticity with known preferences is an order of magnitude smaller, about
0.11.
Trading patterns in a cross-section of traders. While the above discussion bears on the
empirical implications of our model for a cross–section of liquidity shocks, our analysis also
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delivers implications for the cross–section of traders within one liquidity shock.
Ex–ante, all traders are identical, but ex–post they differ, because they had different sample
paths of valuations and information updates. Traders whose valuation recover early and who
observe this rapidly, buy the asset early in the liquidity cycle, and then hold it. In contrast,
traders whose valuations remain low throughout the major part of the liquidity cycle, and who
have many information updates, engage in many round trips. These round trip trades are costly.
They involve sequences of block sales at early stages in the liquidity cycle, when the price is
still low, and an eventual block purchase towards the end of the cycle, when the price is high.
Correspondingly, as shown in Appendix B.2, our model predicts that traders who engaged in
many round–trips tend to earn lower trading profits than those with less frequent trades.21
The left panel of Figure 5 illustrates, in our numerical example, the model-generated rela-
tionship between trading profits and the number of round–trips (measured by the number of
times two consecutive trades by the same trader were of opposite signs, e.g., a purchase fol-
lowed by a sale.) Each blue dot represents the trading profits and number of round–trips of one
trader in a cross-section of 500 traders, under preference uncertainty. The cross-section is rep-
resentative in the sense that traders’ characteristics (initial type, recovery time, and updating
times) are drawn independently according to their “true,” model-implied, probability distribu-
tion. The figure reveals that, with preference uncertainty, there is strong negative relationship
between trading profits and the number of round–trips. In contrast, with known preferences
(as illustrated by the red x-marks in the figure), there is no cross–sectional variation in the
number of round–trips, and therefore no such relation. Hence, for the cross–section of traders,
our model generates qualitatively different predictions for the known preferences and uncertain
preferences cases. The middle panel of Figure 5 illustrates the negative relation between the
number of round–trips and average inventories. Note that, once again, the pattern arising un-
der preference uncertainty (blue dots) is significantly different from that arising with known
preferences (red x-marks).
Since traders whose valuations recover early buy early and keep large holdings throughout
the cycle, their behavior can be interpreted as liquidity supply. Put together, the negative
relations i) between number of round–trips and trading profits, and ii) number of round–trips
and average inventory, imply a positive relation between average inventory and trading profits.
It is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 5. The figure illustrates that, in our model, liquidity
21Trading costs, here, are understood as reflecting only the proceeds from sales minus the cost of purchases,
in the same spirit as in (3). That is, they don’t factor in the utility flow v(θ, q) earned by the financial firm.
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supply is profitable in equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
Information collection, processing and dissemination in financial institutions is challenging, as
emphasized in practitioners’ surveys and consultants’ reports Ernst & Young (2012), Institute
for International Finance (2011), Mehta et al. (2012). Completing these tasks is necessary for
financial institutions to assess the bite of the regulatory and financial constraints they face,
and their corresponding constrained optimal positions. As long as traders are not perfectly
informed about the optimal position for their institution, they face preference uncertainty. We
analyze optimal trading and equilibrium pricing in this context.
We focus on liquidity shocks, during which preference uncertainty is likely to matter most.
Preference uncertainty generates allocative inefficiency, but need not reduce prices. As traders
progressively learn about the preferences of their institution they conduct round–trip trades.
This generates excess trading volume relative to the frictionless case. In a cross–section of
liquidity shocks, the initial price drop is positively correlated with total trading volume. Across
traders, the number of round–trips of a trader is negatively correlated with her trading profits.
While information collection, processing and dissemination frictions within financial insti-
tutions are very important in practice, to the best of our knowledge, Vayanos (2003) offers the
only previous theoretical analysis of this issue. This seminal paper studies the optimal way to
organize the firm to aggregate information. It therefore characterizes the endogenous structure
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of the information factored into the decisions of the financial institution, but it does not study
the consequences of this informational friction for market equilibrium prices. Thus, the present
paper complements Vayanos (2003), since we take as given the informational friction, but study
its consequences for market pricing and trading. It would be interesting, in further research,
to combine the two approaches: endogenize the organization of the firm and the aggregation of
information, as in Vayanos (2003), and study the consequences of the resulting informational
structure for market equilibrium, as in the present paper.
Another important, but challenging, avenue of further research would be to take into ac-
count interconnections and externalities among institutions. In the present model, individual
valuations (θh or θ`) are exogenous. In practice, however, these valuations could be affected
by others’ actions. To study this, one would need a microfoundation for the endogenous deter-
mination of the valuations θh and θ`. For example, in an agency theoretic context, valuations
could be affected by the pledgeable income of an institution (see Tirole, 2006, and Biais, Heider,
and Hoerova, 2013). Thus, price changes, reducing the value of the asset held by an institution
(or increasing its liabilities), would reduce its pledgeable income. In turn, this would reduce
its ability to invest in the asset, which could push its valuation down to θ`. The analysis of the
dynamics equilibrium prices and trades in this context is left for further research.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let us begin by deriving a convenient expression for the intertemporal cost of buying and selling
assets. For this we let τ0 ≡ 0 < τ1 < τ2 < . . . denote the sequence of updating times. For accounting
purposes, we can always assume that, at her n-th updating time, the investor sells all of her assets,
qτn−1,τn , and purchases a new initial holding qτn,τn . Thus, the expected inter-temporal cost of following
the successive holding plans can be written:
C(q) = E
[
−p0s+
∞∑
n=0
{
e−rτnpτnqτn,τn +
∫ τn+1
τn
pu dqτn,ue
−ru − e−rτn+1pτn+1qτn,τn+1
}]
.
Given that pu is continuous and piecewise continuously differentiable, and that u 7→ qτn,u has bounded
variations, we can integrate by part (see Theorem 6.2.2 in Carter and Van Brunt, 2000), keeping in
mind that d/du(e−rupu) = −e−ruξu. This leads to:
C(q) = E
[
−p0s+
∞∑
n=0
∫ τn+1
τn
e−ruξuqτn,u du
]
= −p0s+ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−ruξuqτu,u du
]
.
In the above, the first equality follows by adding and subtracting q0,u = s, and by noting that q0,u is
constant; the second equality follows by using our “τu” notation for the last updating time before u.
With the above result in mind, we find that we can rewrite the intertemporal payoff net of cost as:
V (q)− C(q) = p0s+ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−ru
(
v(θu, qτu,u)− ξuqτu,u
)
du
]
= p0s+ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−ruE
[
v(θu, qτu,u)− ξuqτu,u | Fτu
]
du
]
,
after switching the order of summation and applying the law of iterated expectations.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Because of the Inada conditions, the left–hand–side of (7) goes to infinity when qτu,u goes to 0, and
to 0 when qτu,u goes to infinity. Because of the strict concavity of q 7→ v(θ, q), the left–hand–side of
(7) is strictly decreasing for all qτu,u ∈ (0,∞). Hence there exists a unique solution to (7). Since this
solution only depends on ξu and piτu,u, we denote it by: D(pi, ξ). Since vq(θh, q) > vq(θ`, q), when
piτu,u is raised the left–hand–side of (7) is shifted upwards, while the left–hand–side is shifted upward
when ξu is raised. Hence, D(pi, ξ) is strictly increasing in pi and decreasing in ξ. Finally, since v(θ, q) is
three times continuously differentiable, D(pi, ξ) is twice continuously differentiable. When pi = 0 and
ξ goes to 0, (7) implies that vq(θ`, D(0, ξ)) goes to 0, therefore D(0, ξ) goes to infinity by the Inada
conditions. Similarly, When pi = 1 and ξ goes to infinity, (7) and the Inada conditions imply that
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D(1, ξ) goes to zero.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Aggregate demand is
e−ρu
[
µh,0D(1, ξ) + (1− µh,0)D(pi0,u, ξ)
]
+
∫ u
0
ρe−ρ(u−t)
[
µh,tD(1, ξ) + (1− µh,t)D(pit,u, ξ)
]
dt.
Clearly, this is a strictly decreasing and continuous function of ξ, which is greater than s if ξ = vq(θ`, s),
and smaller than s if ξ = vq(θh, s). Thus, we can can apply the intermediate value theorem to establish
that a unique equilibrium holding cost exists. Because aggregate demand is continuous in (ξ, u) and
because ξu is bounded, ξu must be continuous in u.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Let us begin with a preliminary remark. By definition, any feasible allocation q′ satisfies the market–
clearing condition E
[
q′τu,u
]
= s. Taken together with the fact that ξu = rpu− p˙u is deterministic, this
implies:
C(q′) = −p0s+ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−ruξuq
′
τu,u du
]
= −p0s+
∫ ∞
0
e−ruE
[
q′τu,u
]
ξu du
= −p0s+
∫ ∞
0
e−ruξus du = 0. (26)
With this in mind, consider the equilibrium asset holding plan of Proposition 1, q, and suppose it does
not solve the planning problem. Then there is a feasible asset holding plan q′ that achieves a strictly
higher value, i.e.,
V (q′) > V (q).
But, we just showed above that C(q′) = 0. Subtracting the zero inter-temporal cost from both sides,
we obtain that V (q′) − C(q′) > V (q) − C(q), which contradicts individual optimality. Uniqueness of
the planning solution follows because the planner’s objective is strictly concave and the constraint set
is convex.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Note that:
piτu,u =
µhu − µhτu
1− µhτu
=
1− µhu
1− µhτu
× 0 + µhu − µhτu
1− µhτu
× 1.
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Hence, if D(pi, ξ) is strictly concave in pi, we have that:
µhτuD(1, ξ) +
(
1− µhτu
)
D(piτu,u, ξ)
>µhτuD(1, ξ) +
(
1− µhτu
) [ 1− µhu
1− µhτu
D(0, ξ) +
µhu − µhτu
1− µhτu
D(1, ξ)
]
=µhuD(1, ξ) + (1− µhu)D(0, ξ).
Taking expectations with respect to τu on the left-hand side, we find that, for all ξ, demand is strictly
higher with preference uncertainty. The result follows.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider a first-order Taylor expansion of aggregate asset demand under preference uncertainty when
u ' 0, evaluated at ξ?0:
e−ρu
[
µh,0D(1, ξ
?
0) +
(
1− µh,0
)
D(pi0,u, ξ
?
0)
]
(27)
+
∫ u
0
ρe−ρ(u−t)
[
µh,tD(1, ξ
?
0) + (1− µh,t)D(pi0,t, ξ?0)
]
dt
= [1− ρu] [µh,0D(1, ξ?0) + (1− µh,0)D(0, ξ?0) +Dpi(0, ξ?0)µ′h0u]
+ ρu
[
µh,0D(1, ξ
?
0) + (1− µh,0D(0, ξ?0)
]
+ o(u)
=s+Dpi(0, ξ
?
0)µ
′
h,0u+ o(u). (28)
The second equality follows from the fact that, by definition, µh,0D(1, ξ
?
0) +
(
1− µh,0
)
D(0, ξ?0) = s.
Now consider a first-order Taylor expansion of aggregate demand under known preferences:
µh,uD(1, ξ
?
0) + (1− µh,u)D(0, ξ?0) = s+ [D(1, ξ?0)−D(0, ξ?0]µ′h,0u+ o(u). (29)
Clearly, for small u, the aggregate asset demand at ξ?0 is larger under preference uncertainty if:
Dpi(0, ξ
?
0) > D(1, ξ
?
0)−D(0, ξ?0).
Since ξ?u is continuous at u = 0, this condition also ensures that, as long as u is small enough, aggregate
demand at ξ?u is larger under preference uncertainty. The result follows.
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A.7 Asymptotics: Propositions 5 and 6
A.7.1 Preliminary results
Our maintained assumption on v(θ, q) implies that equilibrium holding costs will remain in the compact
[ξ, ξ], where ξ and ξ solve:
D(0, ξ) = s and D(1, ξ) = s.
The net demand at time u of traders who had their last information update at time t < u is:
D(t, u, ξ) ≡ µh,tD(1, ξ) +
(
1− µh,t
)
D(pit,u, ξ)− s.
It will be enough to study net demand over the domain ∆× [ξ, ξ], where ∆ ≡ {(t, u) ∈ R2+ : t ≤ u}.
Lemma 3 (Properties of net demand). The net demand D(t, u, ξ) is twice continuously differentiable
over ∆ × [ξ, ξ], with bounded first and second derivatives. Moreover Dξ(t, u, ξ) < 0 and is bounded
away from zero.
All results follow from direct calculations of first and second derivatives. The details can be found
in Appendix B.1.1, page 56. Next, we introduce the following notation. For any α > 0, we let
∆α ≡ {(t, u) ∈ R2+ : t ≤ u and u ≥ α}. Fix some function g(ρ) such that limρ→∞ g(ρ) = 0. We say
that a function h(t, u, ρ) is a oα [g(ρ)] if it is bounded over ∆× R+, and if:
lim
ρ→∞
h(t, u, ρ)
g(ρ)
= 0, uniformly over (t, u) ∈ ∆α.
To establish our asymptotic results we repeatedly apply the following Lemma.
Lemma 4. Suppose f(t, u, ρ) is twice continually differentiable with respect to t, and that f(t, u, ρ),
ft(t, u, ρ) and ft,t(t, u, ρ) are all bounded over ∆× R+. Then, for all α > 0,
E [f(τu, u, ρ)] = e−ρuf(0, u, ρ) +
∫ u
0
e−ρ(u−t)ρf(t, u, ρ) dt = f(u, u, ρ)− 1
ρ
ft(u, u, ρ) + oα
(
1
ρ
)
.
This follows directly after two integration by parts:∫ u
0
ρe−ρ(u−t)f(t, u, ρ) dt =f(u, u, ρ)− 1
ρ
ft(u, u, ρ)
+ e−ρu
[
−f(0, u, ρ) + 1
ρ
ft(0, u, ρ)
]
+
1
ρ2
∫ u
0
ρe−ρ(u−t)ft,t(t, u, ρ) dt.
We sometimes also use a related convergence result that apply under weaker conditions:
Lemma 5. Suppose that f(t, u) is bounded, and continuous t = u. Then limρ→∞ E [f(τu, u)] = f(u, u).
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Let M be an upper bound of f(t, u) and, fixing ε > 0, let η be such that |f(t, u)− f(u, u)| < ε for
all t ∈ [u− η, u]. We have:
|E [f(τu, u)]− f(u, u)| ≤ E
[|f(τu, u)− f(u, u)| I{τu∈[0,u−η)}]+ E [|f(τu, u)− f(u, u)| I{τu∈[u−η,u]}]
≤ 2Me−ρη + ε,
since the probability that τu ∈ [0, u− η] is equal to e−ρη. The result follows by letting ρ→∞.
A.7.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Let ξu(ρ) denote the market clearing holding cost at time u when the preference uncertainty parameter
is ρ, i.e., the unique solution of:
e−ρuD(0, u, ξ) +
∫ u
0
ρe−ρ(u−t)D(t, u, ξ) dt = 0.
Note that ξu(ρ) ∈ [ξ, ξ]. Similarly, let ξ?u denote the frictionless market clearing holding cost, solving
D(u, u, ξ) = 0, which also belongs to [ξ, ξ].
The first step is to show that ξu(ρ) converges point wise towards ξ
?
u. For this we note that ξu(ρ)
belongs to the compact [ξ, ξ] so it admits at least one convergence subsequence, with a limit that
we denote by ξˆu. Now use Lemma 4 with f(t, u, ρ) = D(t, u, ξu(ρ)), and recall from Lemma 3 that
D(t, u, ξ) has bounded first and second derivatives. This implies that:
0 = e−ρuD(0, u, ξu(ρ)) +
∫ u
0
ρe−ρ(u−t)D(t, u, ξu(ρ)) dt = D(u, u, ξu(ρ)) + oα(1). (30)
Letting ρ go to infinity we obtain, by continuity, thatD(u, u, ξˆu) = 0, implying that ξˆu = ξ?u. Therefore,
ξ?u is the unique accumulation point of ξu(ρ), and so must be its limit.
The second step is to show that ξu(ρ) = ξ
?
u + oα(1). For this we use again (30), but with a
first-order Taylor expansion of D(u, u, ξu(ρ)). This gives:
0 = D(u, u, ξ?u) +Dξ(u, u, ξˆu(ρ)) [ξu(ρ)− ξ?u] + oα(1),
where ξˆu lies in between ξ
?
u and ξu(ρ). Given that D(u, u, ξ?u) = 0 by definition, and that Dξ is bounded
away from zero, the result follows.
Now, for the last step, we use again to Lemma 4, with f(t, u, ρ) = D(t, u, ξu(ρ)):
0 =D(u, u, ξu(ρ))−
1
ρ
Dt(u, u, ξu(ρ))
+ e−ρu
1
ρ
Dt(0, u, ξu(ρ)) +
1
ρ2
∫ u
0
ρe−ρtDt,t(t, u, ξ(ρ)) dt.
Clearly, by our maintained assumptions on D(t, u, ξ), the terms on the second line add up to a oα(1/ρ).
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Also, recall that ξu(ρ) = ξ
?
u + oα(1) and note that Dt(t, u, ξ) has bounded derivatives and thus is
uniformly continuous over ∆ × [ξ, ξ], implying that Dt(u, u, ξu(ρ)) = Dt(u, u, ξ?u) + oα(1). Taken
together, we obtain:
0 =D(u, u, ξu(ρ))−
1
ρ
Dt(u, u, ξ?u) + oα
(
1
ρ
)
=D(u, u, ξ?u) +Dξ(u, u, ξ?u) [ξu(ρ)− ξ?u]
+
1
2
Dξ,ξ(u, u, ξˆu(ρ) [ξu(ρ)− ξ?u]2 −
1
ρ
Dt(u, u, ξ?u) + oα
(
1
ρ
)
,
for some ξˆu(ρ) in between ξ
?
u and ξu(ρ). Keeping in mind that D(u, u, ξ?u) = 0, we obtain:
[ξu(ρ)− ξ?u(ρ)]
{
1 +
Dξ,ξ(u, u, ξˆu(ρ))
2Dξ(u, u, ξ?u)
[ξu(ρ)− ξ?u]
}
=
1
ρ
Dt(u, u, ξ?u)
Dξ(u, u, ξ?u)
+ oα
(
1
ρ
)
.
The term in the curly bracket on the left-hand size is 1+oα(1), and the result follows after substituting
the explicit expression of Dt(u, u, ξ?u) and Dξ(u, u, ξ?u).
A.7.3 Proof of Proposition 6
We first need to establish further asymptotic convergence results. First:
Lemma 6. For large ρ, the time derivative of the holding cost admits the approximation:
dξu(ρ)
du
=
dξ?u
du
+ oα(1).
The proof is in Appendix B.1.2, page 58. Now, using Proposition 5 and 6, it follows that:
Lemma 7. The holding plans and their derivatives converge α-uniformly to their frictionless coun-
terparts:
q`,t,u = q
?
`,t,u + oα(1),
∂q`,t,u
∂t
=
∂q?`,t,u
∂t
+ oα(1),
∂q`,t,u
∂u
=
∂q?`,t,u
∂u
+ oα(1)
qh,u = q
?
h,u + oα(1),
dqh,u
du
=
dq?h,u
du
+ oα(1).
The proof is in Appendix B.1.3, page 59. With these results in mind, let us turn to the various
components of the volume, in equation (18). The first term of equation (18) is:
E
[
µh,τu
∣∣∣∣dqh,udu
∣∣∣∣] = E [µh,τu ∣∣∣∣dq?h,udu
∣∣∣∣+ oα(1)] = µh,u ∣∣∣∣dq?h,udu
∣∣∣∣+ o(1),
where the first equality follows from Lemma 7. The second equality follows from Lemma 4 and from
the observation that, by dominated convergence, E [oα(1)] → 0 as ρ → ∞.22 The second term of
22Indeed for g(t, u, ρ) = oα(1), |E [g(τu, u, ρ)]| ≤ supt∈[0,α] |g(t, u, ρ)|e−ρ(u−α) +
∫ u
α
ρ|g(t, u, ρ)|e−ρ(u−t) dt. The
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equation (18) is:
E
[(
1− µh,τu
) ∣∣∣∣∂q`,t,u∂u
∣∣∣∣] = E [(1− µh,τu) ∣∣∣∣∂q?`,τu,u∂u
∣∣∣∣+ oα(1)]→ (1− µh,u) ∣∣∣∣∂q?`,t,u∂u
∣∣∣∣ ,
by an application of Lemma 5. For the first term on the second line of equation (18) is:
ρE
[
(1− µh,τu)piτu,u|qh,u − q`,τu,u|
]
= ρE
[
(µh,u − µh,τu) (qh,u − q`,τu,u)
]
=µ′h,u (qh,u − q`,u,u) + oα(1)→ µ′h,u
(
q?h,u − q?`,u,u
)
,
where the first equality follows from the definition of pit,u and from the observation that qh,u ≥ q`,τu,u,
and where the second equality follows from an application of Lemma 4. The limit follows from Lemma
7. Finally, using the same logic, the last term on the second line of equation (18) is:
ρE
[
µh,τu (1− piτu,u) |q`,u,u − q`,τu,u|
]
= ρE
[(
1− µh,u
)
(q`,τu,u − q`,u,u)
]
=
(
1− µh,u
) ∂q`,u,u
∂t
+ oα(1)→
(
1− µh,u
) ∂q?`,u,u
∂t
.
Collecting terms, we obtain the desired formula for V∞ − V ?. Next, consider the necessary and
sufficient condition for
∂q?`,u,u
∂u > 0. We first note that:
∂q?`,u,u
∂u
= Dpi(0, ξ
?
u)
∂piu,u
∂u
+Dξ(0, ξ
?
u)
dξ?u
du
.
The holding cost ξ?u solves:
µh,uD(1, ξ) + (1− µh,u)D(0, ξ) = s⇒
dξ?u
du
=
µ′h,u [D(1, ξ
?
u)−D(0, ξ?u)]
µh,uDξ(1, ξ
?
u) + (1− µh,u)Dξ(0, ξ?u)
,
using the Implicit Function Theorem. The result follows by noting that µ′h,u = γ(1 − µh,u) and
∂piu,u
∂u = γ.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 7
To clarify the exposition, our notations in this section are explicit about the fact that utility functions
and equilibrium objects depend on ε: e.g., we write m(q, ε) instead of m(q), ξu(ε) instead of ξu, etc...
We begin with preliminary properties of the function m(q, ε).
Lemma 8. The function m(q, ε) is continuous in (q, ε) ∈ [0,∞)2, and satisfies m(0, ε) = 0 and
limq→∞m(q, ε) = 1. For ε > 0, it is strictly increasing, strictly concave, three time continuously
differentiable over (q, ε) ∈ [0,∞) × (0,∞), and satisfies Inada conditions limq→0mq(q, ε) = ∞, and
first term goes to zero because g(t, u, ρ) is bounded, and the second one goes to zero because g(t, u, ρ) converges
uniformly to 0 over [α, u].
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limq→∞mq(q, ε)→ 0. Lastly, its first and second derivatives satisfy, for all q > 0:
lim
ε→0
mq(q, ε) =

1 if q < 1
1/(1 + e) if q = 1
0 if q > 1
lim
ε→0
mqq(q, ε) =

0 if q < 1
−∞ if q = 1
0 if q > 1
The proof is in Appendix B.1.4, page 59. Having shown that m(q, ε) is continuous even at points
such that ε = 0, we can on to apply the Maximum Theorem (see, e.g., Stokey and Lucas, 1989,
Theorem 3.6) to show that demands are continuous in all parameters. We let:
D(pi, ξ, ε) = arg max
ξq≤2
m(q, ε)− δ (1− pi) m(q, ε)
1+σ
1 + σ
− ξq.
Note that the constraint q ≤ 2/ξ is not binding: when q > 2/ξ, the objective is strictly negative since
m(q, ε) ≤ 1, and so it can be improved by choosing q = 0. Thus, the maximization problem satisfies
the condition of the Theorem of the Maximum: the objective is continuous in all variables, and the
constraint set is a compact valued continuous correspondence of ξ. This implies that D(pi, ξ, ε) is
non-empty, compact valued, and upper hemi continuous. Moreover, the demand is single-valued in all
cases except when pi = 1, ξ = 1, and ε = 0, in which case it is equal to [0, 1].
Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. When ε > 0, this follows directly from Propo-
sition 1. When ε = 0, an equilibrium holding cost solves:
E
[
µh,τuqh,τu,u +
(
1− µh,τu
)
D(piτu,u, ξ, 0)
]
= s.
for some qh,τu,u ∈ D(1, ξ, 0). One verifies easily that, for pi = 1, D(1, ξ, 0) = 1 for all ξ ∈ (0, 1),
D(1, ξ, 0) = [0, 1] for ξ = 1, and D(1, ξ, 0) = 0 for all ξ > 1. For pi < 1, D(pi, ξ, 0) = 0 for all ξ ≥ 1.
One sees that ξ ≤ 1 or otherwise the market cannot clear. Then, there are two cases:
• If E [µh,τu] ≥ s, and ξ < 1, then D(1, ξ, 0) = 1 and the market cannot clear. Thus, the market
clearing holding cost is ξu = 1, high-valuation holdings are indeterminate but must add up to
s, and low-valuation holdings are equal to zero.
• If E [µh,τu] < s, then ξ < 1. Otherwise, if ξ = 1, D(pi, ξ, 0) = 0 for all pi < 1 and the market
cannot clear. Because D(1, ξ, 0) = 1 and D(pi, ξ, 0) is strictly decreasing, in this case as well
there a unique market clearing holding cost, ξu(0). High-valuation traders hold qh,u(0) = 1, and
low-valuation traders hold q`,τu,u = D(piτu,u, ξ, 0).
Convergence of holding costs. For all ε ≥ 0, let ξu(ε) be the market clearing holding cost
at time u. For ε > 0, let ξ(ε) ≡ mq(s, ε) (1− δm(s, ε)σ) and ξ(ε) = mq(s, ε), so that D(1, ξ(ε), ε) =
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D(1, ξ(ε), ε) = s. Clearly, for all ε > 0, ξu(ε) ∈ [ξ(ε), ξ(ε)]. Moreover, from Lemma 8, it follows that
limε→0 ξ(ε) = 1− δ limε→0 ξ(ε) = 1, so that ξ(ε) and ξ(ε) remain in some compact [ξ, ξ], s.t. ξ > 0.
Thus, ξu(ε) has at least one convergence subsequence as ε→ 0, with some limit ξˆu. When pi < 1, we
have by upper hemi continuity that a subsequence of D(pi, ξu(ε), ε) converges to some qˆh,u ∈ D(1, ξˆu, 0),
and we have by continuity that D(pi, ξu(ε), ε)→ D(pi, ξˆu, 0), and when pi = 1. Moreover, by dominated
convergence, E
[
(1− µh,τu)D(piτu,u, ξu(ε), ε)
] → E [(1− µh,τu)D(piτu,u, ξˆu, 0)]. Taken together, we
obtain that:
E
[
µh,τu qˆh,u +
(
1− µh,τu
)
D(piτu,u, ξˆu, 0)
]
= s,
where qˆh,u ∈ D(1, ξˆu, 0). Therefore, ξˆu is an equilibrium holding cost of the ε = 0 economy, which we
know must be equal to ξu(0). Thus, the unique accumulation point of ξu(ε) is ξu(0), and so it must
be its limit.
Convergence of holding plans. Let q`,t,u(ε) ≡ D(pit,u, ξu(ε), ε). Let qh,u(ε) ≡ D(1, ξu, ε)
whenever the correspondence is single-valued. When it is multi-valued, which only arises when ε = 0
and ξu(0) = 1, we let qh,u ≡ s/E
[
µh,τu
]
. We have two cases to consider:
• If pi ∈ [0, 1), or if pi = 1 and ξu(0) < 1, then D(pi, ξ, ε) is singled valued and thus continuous in
a neighborhood of (ξu(0), 0). Therefore D(pi, ξu(ε), ε)→ D(pi, ξu(0), 0), i.e., ε > 0 holding plan
converge to their ε = 0 counterparts.
• If pi = 1 and ξu(0) = 1, which occurs when E
[
µh,τu
] ≥ s, we have:
E
[
µh,τu
]
qh,u(ε) + E
[
(1− µh,τu)q`,τu,u(ε)
]
= s.
But we have just shown that q`,τu,u(ε)→ 0. Moreover, q`,τu,u(ε) ≤ qh,u(ε) ≤ s/E
[
µh,τu
]
other-
wise the market would not clear. Thus, by dominated convergence, E
[
(1− µh,τu)q`,τu,u(ε)
]→ 0.
From the market clearing condition, this implies that qh,u(ε)→ qh,u(0) = s/E
[
µh,τu
]
.
Convergence of the volume. Fixing some ε > 0 positive and small enough, the specification
of preferences satisfy our basic regularity conditions. So, we have that the excess volume when ρ→∞
converges to:
max
{(
1− µh,u
) ∂q?`,u,u(ε)
∂u
, 0
}
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where, as before, we use the star “?” to index holding plans and holding costs in the equilibrium with
known preferences. Next, we will show that:
lim
ε→0
max
{(
1− µh,u
) ∂q?`,u,u(ε)
∂u
, 0
}
= γmax
{
s− µh,u
σ
− (1− s), 0
}
,
which is equal to the excess volume in the ε = 0 equilibrium, as is shown formally later in Appendix
A.9.3 For this we recall that:
q?`,t,u(ε) = D(pit,u, ξ
?
u(ε))⇒
∂q?`,u,u
∂u
= Dpi(0, ξ
?
u(ε))
∂piu,u
∂u
+Dξ (0, ξ
?
u(ε))
dξ?u(ε)
du
. (31)
The holding cost ξ?u(ε) solves:
µh,uD(1, ξ, ε) + (1− µh,u)D(0, ξ, ε) = s.
Thus, by the Implicit Function Theorem, the time derivative of ξ?u(ε) is:
dξ?u(ε)
du
= − µ
′
h,u [D(1, ξ
?
u(ε), ε)−D(0, ξ?u(ε), ε)]
µh,uDξ(1, ξ
?
u(ε), ε) +
(
1− µh,u
)
Dξ(0, ξ
?
u(ε), ε)
.
For any (pi, ξ, ε), with ε > 0, the demand D(pi, ξ, ε) is the unique solution of
0 = H(q, pi, ξ, ε)− ξ, where H(q, pi, ξ, ε) ≡ mq(q, ε) [1− δ(1− pi)m(q, ε)σ] .
Using the Implicit Function Theorem, Dpi(pi, ξ, ε) = −Hpi/Hq and Dξ(pi, ξ, ε) = −Hξ/Hq, all evaluated
at q = D(pi, ξ, ε) and (pi, ξ, ε). To evaluate the limit of (31) as ε→ 0, we start with some preliminary
asymptotic results.
Step 1: preliminary results. By continuity of m(q, ε) we have:
lim
ε→0
m(q?`,u,u(ε), ε) = m(q
?
`,u,u(0), 0) = q
?
`,u,u(0) (32)
lim
ε→0
m(q?h,u(ε), ε) = m(q
?
h,u(0), 0) = q
?
h,u(0), (33)
where, on both lines, the second equality follows by noting that, since ξ?u(0) > 0 (otherwise the market
would not clear), we have q?`,u,u(ε) ≤ 1 and q?h,u(0) ≤ 1. The first-order condition of low-valuation
traders is:
ξ?u(ε) = mq(q
?
`,u,u(ε), ε)
(
1− δm(q?`,u,u(ε), ε)σ
)
.
Taking ε→ 0 limits on both sides we obtain that:
ξ?u(0) = lim
ε→0
mq(q
?
`,u,u(ε), ε)
(
1− δ (q?`,u,u(0))σ) .
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When ε = 0, since q?`,u,u(0) ≤ s < 1, the first-order condition of a low-valuation trader is ξ?u(0) =(
1− δ
(
q?`,u,u(0)
)σ)
. Hence:
lim
ε→0
mq(q
?
`,u,u(ε), ε) = 1. (34)
Using (54) and the fact that q?`,u,u(0) ≤ s < 1, this implies in turns that:
lim
ε→0
(
q?`,u,u(ε)
)−ε
= 1. (35)
Turning to the first-order condition of a high-valuation trader, we obtain:
lim
ε→0
mq(q
?
h,u(ε)) = ξ
?
u(0). (36)
If µh,u < s, then ξ
?
u(0) < 1 and it follows from the analytical expression of mq(q, ε), in equation (54),
that:
lim
ε→0
e
1
ε
(
1− q
?
h,u(ε)
1−ε
)
<∞.
Therefore the analytical expression of mqq(q, ε), in equation (55), implies that:
lim
ε→0
mqq(q
?
h,u(ε), ε) = −∞ if µh,u < s. (37)
Lastly, when µh,u < s, ξ
?
u(0) < 1 implies that q
?
`,u,u(0) > 1 and, using (55) together with (35) , that
lim
ε→0
mqq(q
?
`,u(ε), ε) = 0 if µh,u < s. (38)
Step 2: limit of volume when µh,u < s. We have
Dpi(0, ξ
?
u(ε)) = −
δmqm
σ
mqq(1− δmσ)− δσm2qmσ−1
where m, mq and mqq are all evaluated at q
?
`,u,u(ε) and ε. Using (32), (34), and (38), we obtain that:
lim
ε→0
Dpi(0, ξ
?
u(ε)) =
q?`,u,u(0)
σ
.
A similar argument shows that:
lim
ε→0
Dξ(0, ξ
?
u(ε)) = lim
ε→0
1
mqq(1− δmσ)− δσm2qmσ−1
= − 1
δσ
(
q?`,u,u
)σ−1 .
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Lastly, using (33), (36), and (37), we have
lim
ε→0
Dξ(1, ξ
?
u(ε)) = lim
ε→0
1
mqq(1− δmσ)− δσm2qmσ−1
= 0,
where m, mq, and mqq are evaluated at q
?
h,u(ε) and ε. Now using these limits in (31) we obtain that
lim
ε→0
∂q?`,u,u(ε)
∂u
= γ
q?`,u,u(0)
σ
+ γ
(
q?h,u(0)− q?`,u,u(0)
)
.
When ε = 0 and µh,u < s, ξ
?
u(0) < 1 implying that q
?
h,u(0) = 1 and, from market clearing, that
q?`,u,u(0) = (s − µh,u)/(1 − µh,u). Plugging these expressions into the above, we obtain the desired
result.
Step 3: limit when µh,u ≥ s. In this case we note that
∂q?`,u,u(ε)
∂u
≤ γDpi(0, ξ?u(ε)) ≤ γ
δmqm
σ
−mqq(1− δmσ) + δσm2qmσ−1
≤ γ δmqm
σ
δσm2qm
σ−1 =
γm
δmq
→ 0,
using (32) and (34), where m, mq and mqq are evaluated at q
?
`,u,u(ε) and ε. Clearly, this implies that
lim
ε→0
max
{(
1− µh,u
) ∂q?`,u,u(ε)
∂u
, 0
}
= 0 = γmax
{
s− µh,u
σ
− (1− s), 0
}
,
given that µh,u ≥ s.
A.9 Proof of Propositions 8, 9, and 10
A.9.1 A characterization of equilibrium object
Let
Su ≡ s− E
[
µh,τu
]
= e−ρu(s− µh,0) +
∫ u
0
ρe−ρ(u−t)(s− µh,t)dt, (39)
the gross asset supply in the hand of investors, minus the maximum (unit) demand of high–valuation
investors. Keeping in mind that Ts is the time such that µh,Ts = s, one sees that Su has a unique root
Tf > Ts. Indeed, Su > 0 for all u ∈ [0, Ts) and Su goes to minus infinity when u goes infinity, so Su
has a root Tf > Ts. It is unique because S˙Tf = ρ(s− µh,Tf ) < 0 since Tf > Ts.
We already know from the text that, when u ≥ Tf , ξu = 1, qh,u ∈ [0, 1] and q`,τu,u = 0.23 Now
consider u ∈ [0, Tf ). In that case, Su > 0 and we already know that ξu < 1, which implies that
23The holding of high-valuation trader is indeterminate. However, it is natural to assume that they have
identical holdings, qh,u = s/E
[
µh,τu
]
. Indeed, we have seen that this is the limit of high-valuation investors’
holdings as ε→ 0.
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high–valuation investors hold one unit, qh,u = 1. Replacing expression (8) for piτu,u into the asset
demand (23) we obtain that:
q`,τu,u = min{(1− µh,τu)1/σQu, 1}, where Qu ≡
(
1− ξu
δ(1− µh,u)
)1/σ
.
This is the formula for holding plans in Proposition 8 Plugging this back into the market clearing
condition (24), we obtain that Qu solves:
e−ρu(1−µh,0) min{(1−µh,0)1/σQu, 1}+
∫ u
0
ρe−ρ(u−t)(1−µh,t) min{(1−µh,t)1/σQu, 1} dt = Su. (40)
The left-hand side of (40) is continuous, strictly increasing for Qu < (1 − µh,u)−1/σ and constant for
Qu ≥ (1−µh,u)−1/σ. It is zero when Qu = 0, and strictly larger than Su when Qu = (1−µh,u)−1/σ since
s < 1. Therefore, equation (40) has a unique solution and the solution satisfies 0 < Qu < (1−µh,u)−1/σ.
Now, turning to the price, the definition of Qu implies that the price solves rpu = 1 − δ(1 −
µh,u)Q
σ
u + p˙u for u < Tf . For u ≥ Tf , the fact that high-valuation traders are indifferent between
any asset holdings in [0, 1] implies that rpu = 1 + p˙u. But the price is bounded and positive, so it
follows that pu = 1/r. Since the price is continuous at Tf , this provides a unique candidate equilibrium
price path. Clearly this candidate is C1 over (0, Tf ) and (Tf ,∞). To show that it is continuously
differentiable at Tf note that, given QTf = 0 and pTf = 1/r, the ODE rpu = 1 − δ(1 − µh,u)Qσu + p˙u
implies that p˙T−f
= 0. Obviously, since the price is constant after Tf , p˙T+f
= 0 as well. We conclude
that p˙u is continuous at u = Tf as well.
Next, we show that the candidate equilibrium thus constructed is indeed an equilibrium. For this
recall that 0 < Qu < (1− µh,u)−1/σ, which immediately implies that 0 < 1− rpu + p˙u < 1 for u < Tf .
It follows that high-valuation traders find it optimal to hold one unit. Now one can directly verify
that, for u < Tf , the problem of low-valuation traders is solved by qt,u = min{(1 − µh,t)−1/σQu, 1}.
For u ≥ Tf , 1− rpu+ p˙u = 0 and so the problem of high-valuation traders is solved by any qt,u ∈ [0, 1],
while the problem of low-valuation traders is clearly solved by qt,u = 0. The asset market clears at all
dates by construction.
A.9.2 Concluding the proof of Proposition 8: the shape of Qu
We begin with preliminary results that we use repeatedly in this appendix. For the first preliminary
result, consider equation (40) after removing the min operator in the integral:
e−ρu(1− µh,0)1+1/σQu +
∫ u
0
ρe−ρ(u−t)(1− µh,t)1+1/σQu dt = Su
⇐⇒ Qu =
(s− µh,0) +
∫ u
0 ρe
ρt(s− µh,t) dt
(1− µh,0)1+1/σ +
∫ u
0 ρe
ρt(1− µh,t)1+1/σ dt
. (41)
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Now, whenever (1 − µh,0)1/σQu ≤ 1, it is clear that Qu also solves equation (40). Given that the
solution of (40) is unique it follows that Qu = Qu. Conversely if Qu = Qu, subtracting (40) from (41)
shows that:(
(1− µh,0)1/σQu −min{(1− µh,0)1/σQu, 1}
)
+
∫ u
0
ρe−ρ(u−t)(1− µh,t)
(
(1− µh,t)1/σQu −min{(1− µh,t)1/σQu, 1}
)
dt = 0.
Since the first term and the integrand are positive, this can only be true if (1−µh,0)1/σQu ≤ 1. Taken
together, we obtain:
Lemma 9 (A useful equivalence). Qu ≤ (1− µh,0)−1/σ if and only if Qu = Qu.
The next Lemma, proved in Section B.1.5, page 60, provides basic properties of Qu:
Lemma 10 (Preliminary results aboutQu). The function Qu is continuous, satisfies Q0 =
s−µh,0
(1−µh,0)1+1/σ
and QTf = 0. It is strictly decreasing over (0, Tf ] if
s−µh,0
1−µh,0 ≤
σ
1+σ and hump-shaped otherwise.
Taken together, Lemma 9 and Lemma 10 immediately imply that
Lemma 11. The function Qu satisfies Q0 =
s−µh,0
(1−µh,0)1+1/σ , QTf = 0. If
s−µh,0
1−µh,0 ≤
σ
1+σ , then it is strictly
decreasing over (0, Tf ]. If
s−µh,0
1−µh,0 >
σ
1+σ and Qu ≤ (1−µh,0)−1/σ for all u ∈ (0, Tf ], Qu is hump-shaped
over (0, Tf ].
The only case that is not covered by the Lemma is when
s−µh,0
1−µh,0 >
σ
1+σ and Qu > (1−µh,0)−1/σ for
some u ∈ (0, Tf ]. In this case, note that for u small and u close to Tf , we have that Qu < (1−µh,0)−1/σ.
Given that Qu is hump-shaped, it follows that the equation Qu = (1 − µh,0)−1/σ has two solutions,
0 < T1 < T2 < Tf . For u ∈ (0, T1] (resp. u ∈ [T2, Tf ]), Qu ≤ (1 − µh,0)−1/σ and is increasing (resp.
decreasing), and thus Lemma 9 implies thatQu = Qu and increasing (resp. decreasing) as well. We first
establish thatQu is piecewise continuously differentiable. Let Ψ(Q) ≡ inf{ψ ≥ 0 : (1−µh,ψ)1/σQ ≤ 1},
and ψu ≡ Ψ(Qu). Thus, ψu > 0 if and only if u ∈ (T1, T2). We have:
Lemma 12. Qu is continuously differentiable except in T1 and T2, and
Q′u =
ρeρu
(
s− µh,u − (1− µh,u)1+1/σQu
)
I{ψu=0}(1− µh,0)1+1/σ +
∫ u
ψu
ρeρt(1− µh,t)1+1/σ dt
. (42)
The proof is in Appendix B.1.6, page 61. In particular, (42) implies that QT+1
has the same sign as
QT−1
, which is positive, and that QT−2
has the same sign as QT+2
, which is negative. Thus, Qu changes
sign at least once in (T1, T2). To conclude, in Section B.1.7, page 62, we establish:
Lemma 13. The derivative Q′u changes sign only once in (T1, T2).
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A.9.3 Proof of Proposition 9: asymptotic volume
In Section B.1.8, page 63 in the supplementary appendix, we prove the following asymptotic results:
Lemma 14. As ρ goes to infinity:
Tf (ρ) ↓ Ts (43)
Qu(ρ) =
s− µh,u
(1− µh,u)1+1/σ
− 1
ρ
γ
(1− µh,u)1/σ
[(
1 +
1
σ
)
s− µh,u
1− µh,u
− 1
]
+ o
(
1
ρ
)
, ∀u ∈ [0, Ts]
(44)
Tψ(ρ) = arg max
u∈[0,Tf (ρ)]
Qu(ρ) −→ arg max
u∈[0,Ts]
s− µh,u
(1− µh,u)1+1/σ
. (45)
With this in mind we can study the asymptotic behavior of volume.
Basic formulas. As above, let Tψ denote the arg max of the function Qu. For any time u < Tψ and
some time interval [u, u+ du], the only traders who sell are those who have an updating time during
this time interval, and who find out that they have a low valuation. Thus, trading volume during
[u, u + du] can be computed as the volume of assets sold by these investors, as follows. Just before
their updating time, low–valuation investors hold on average:
E [q`,τu,u] = e−ρuq`,0,u +
∫ u
0
ρe−ρ(u−t)q`,t,u dt. (46)
Instantaneous trading volume is then:
Vu = ρ(1− µh,u)
(
E [q`,τu,u]− q`,u,u
)
, (47)
where ρ(1 − µh,u) is the measure of low–valuations investors having an updating time, the term in
large parentheses is the average size of low–valuation investors’ sell orders, and q`,u,u is their asset
holding right after the updating time.
For any time u ∈ (Tψ, Tf ) and some time interval [u, u + du], the only traders who buy are those
who have an updating time during this time interval, and who find out that they have switched from
a low to a high valuation. Trading volume during [u, u+ du] can be computed as the volume of assets
purchased by these traders:
Vu = ρE
[
(1− µh,τu)piτu,u (1− q`,τu,u)
]
= ρE
[(
µh,u − µh,τu
)
(1− q`,τu,u)
]
, (48)
where the second equality follows by definition of piτu,u.
Finally, for u > Tf , the trading volume is not zero since high–valuation traders continue to buy
from the low valuation investors having an updating time:
Vu = ρ(1− µhu)E [q`,τu,u] . (49)
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Taking the ρ→∞ limit. We first note that q`,u,u(ρ) = min{(1−µh,u)1/σQu, 1} = (1−µh,u)1/σQu(ρ).
Next, we need to calculate an approximation for:
E [q`,τu,u] = q`,0,ue−ρu +
∫ u
0
min{(1− µh,t)1/σQu(ρ), 1}ρe−ρ(u−t) dt.
For this we follow the same calculations leading to equation (63) in the proof of Lemma 14, but with
f(t, ρ) = min{(1− µh,t)1/σQu(ρ), 1}. This gives:
E [q`,τu,u] = f(0, u)e−ρu +
∫ u
0
ρe−ρ(u−t)f(t, ρ) dt = f(u, ρ)− 1
ρ
ft(u, ρ) + o
(
1
ρ
)
= (1− µh,u)1/σQu(ρ) +
1
ρ
γ
σ
s− µh,u
1− µh,u
+ o
(
1
ρ
)
=
s− µh,u
1− µh,u
+
γ
ρ
1− s
1− µh,u
+ o
(
1
ρ
)
,
where the second line follows from plugging equation (44) into the first line. Substituting this expres-
sion into equations (47) and (48), we find after some straightforward manipulation that, when ρ goes
to infinity, Vu → γ(s− µh,u)/σ for u < Tψ(∞), Vu → γ(1− s) for u ∈ (limTψ(∞), Ts), and Vu → 0 for
u > Ts.
The trading volume in the Walrasian equilibrium is equal to the measure of low–valuation investors
who become high-valuation investors: γ(1 − µh,u), times the amount of asset they buy at that time:
1− (s− µh,u)/(1− µh,u). Thus the trading volume is γ(1− s). To conclude the proof, note that after
taking derivatives of Qu(∞) with respect to u, it follows that
Q′Tψ(∞)(∞) = 0⇔
s− µhTψ(∞)
σ
= 1− s
which implies in turn that γ(s− µh,u)/σ > γ(1− s) for u < Tψ(∞).
A.9.4 Proof of Proposition 10
We have already argued that the price is continuously differentiable. To prove that it is strictly
increasing for u ∈ [0, Tf ), we let ∆u ≡ (1− µh,u)1/σQu for u ≤ Tf , and ∆u = 0 for u ≥ Tf . In Section
B.1.9, page 65 in the supplementary appendix, we show that:
Lemma 15. The function ∆u is strictly decreasing over (0, Tf ].
Now, in terms of ∆u, the price writes:
pu =
∫ ∞
u
e−r(y−u)
(
1− δ∆σy
)
dy =
∫ ∞
0
e−rz
(
1− δ∆σz+u
)
dz,
after the change of variable y − u = z. Since ∆u is strictly decreasing over u ∈ (0, Tf ), and constant
over [Tf ,∞), it clearly follows from the above formula that pu is strictly increasing over u ∈ (0, Tf ).
Next:
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First bullet point: when (25) does not hold. Given the ODEs satisfied by the price path,
it suffices to show that, for all u ∈ (0, Ts),
(1− µh,u)Qσu >
(
s− µh,u
1− µh,u
)σ
.
Besides, when condition (25) holds, it follows from Lemma 9 and Lemma 10 that:
Qu = Qu =
s− µh,0 +
∫ u
0 e
ρt(s− µh,t) dt
(1− µh,0)1+1/σ +
∫ u
0 e
ρt(1− µh,t)1+1/σ dt
.
Plugging the above and rearranging, we are left with showing that:
Fu = (s− µh,u)
[
(1− µh,0)1+1/σ +
∫ u
0
eρt(1− µh,t)1+1/σ dt
]
− (1− µh,u)1+1/σ
[
s− µh,0 +
∫ u
0
eρt(s− µh,t)
]
< 0.
But we know from the proof of Lemma 10, equation (56), page 60, that Fu has the same sign as Q
′
u,
which we know is negative at all u > 0 since
s−µh,0
1−µh,0 ≤
σ
σ+1 .
Second bullet point: when condition (25) holds and when s is close to 1 and σ is
close to 0. The price at time 0 is equal to:
p0 =
∫ +∞
0
e−ruξu du.
With known preferences, ξ?u = 1 − δ
(
s−µh,u
1−µh,u
)σ
= 1 − δ
(
1− 1−s1−µh,0 e
γu
)σ
for u < Ts, and ξ
?
u = 1 for
u > Ts. Therefore p
?
0 = 1/r − δJ?(s), where:
J?(s) ≡
∫ Ts
0
e−ru
(
1− 1− s
1− µh,0
eγu
)σ
du,
where we make the dependence of J?(s) on s explicit. Similarly, with preference uncertainty, the price
at time 0 is equal to p0 = 1/r − δJ(s), where:
J(s) ≡
∫ Tf
0
e−ru(1− µh,u)Qσu du.
We begin with a Lemma proved in Section B.1.10, page 67:
Lemma 16. When s goes to 1, both J?(s) and J(s) go to 1/r.
Therefore, p0 goes to (1 − δ)/r both with continuous and infrequent updating. Besides, with
54
continuous updating:
p0(s0) = (1− δ)/r + δ
∫ 1
s0
J?′(s) ds,
and with infrequent updating:
p0(s0) = (1− δ)/r + δ
∫ 1
s0
J ′(s) ds.
The next two lemmas compare J?′(s) and J ′(s) for s in the neighborhood of 1 when σ is not too large.
The first Lemma is proved in Section B.1.11, page 67.
Lemma 17. When s goes to 1:
J?′(s) ∼ σ × constant if r > γ,
J?′(s) ∼ Γ1(σ) log((1− s)−1) if r = γ,
J?′(s) ∼ Γ2(σ)(1− s)−1+r/γ if r < γ,
where the constant terms Γ1(σ) and Γ2(σ) go to 0 when σ → 0.
In this Lemma and all what follows f(s) ∼ g(s) means that f(s)/g(s) → 1 when s → 1. The
second Lemma is proved in Section B.1.12, page 68 in the supplementary appendix:
Lemma 18. Assume γ + γ/σ − ρ > 0. There exists a function J˜ ′(s) ≤ J ′(s) such that, when s goes
to 1:
J˜ ′(s)→ +∞ if r > γ,
J˜ ′(s) ∼ Γ3(σ) log((1− s)−1) if r = γ,
J˜ ′(s) ∼ Γ4(σ)(1− s)−1+r/γ if r < γ,
where the constant terms Γ3(σ) and Γ4(σ) go to strictly positive limits when σ → 0.
Lemmas 17 and 18 imply that, if σ is close to 0, then J ′(s) > J?′(s) for s in the left-neighborhood
of 1. The second point of the proposition then follows.
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B Supplementary Appendix (not for publication)
This supplementary appendix provides ommitted proofs and establishes results to complement the
main analysis.
B.1 Omitted proofs
B.1.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Twice continuous differentiability follows directly from the fact that D(pi, ξ), µh,t and pit,u are all twice
continuously differentiable. Boundedness is proved from the following direct calculations. First, note
that:
pit,u =
µh,u − µh,t
1− µh,t
= 1− 1− µh,u
1− µh,t
,
which implies that:
∂pit,u
∂u
=
µ′h,u
1− µh,t
and
∂pit,u
∂t
= −µ′h,t
1− µh,u
[1− µh,t]2
. (50)
First derivative with respect to t: Dt(t, u, ξ). Then we can calculate the partial derivative ofD(t, u, ξ)
with respect to t
Dt(t, u, ξ) = µ′h,tD(1, ξ)− µ′h,tD(pit,u, ξ) +
[
1− µh,t
]
Dpi(pit,u, ξ)
∂pit,u
∂t
= µ′h,t
{
D(1, ξ)−D(pit,u, ξ)−
1− µh,u
1− µh,t
Dpi(pit,u, ξ)
}
, (51)
which is bounded over the relevant range, ∆× [ξ, ξ], because: µ′h,t = γe−γt is bounded; (1−µh,u)/(1−
µh,t) = e
−γ(u−t) and so is bounded; pit,u ∈ [0, 1] and so is bounded; D(pi, ξ) and Dpi(pi, ξ) are continuous
over the compact [0, 1]× [ξ, ξ] and so are bounded as well.
First derivative with respect to u: Du(t, u, ξ). We have:
Du(t, u, ξ) =
[
1− µh,t
]
Dpi(pit,u, ξ)
∂pit,u
∂u
= µ′h,uDpi(pit,u, ξ),
which is bounded over the relevant range for the same reasons as above.
First derivative with respect to ξ: Dξ(t, u, ξ). We have
D(t, u, ξ) = µh,tDξ(1, ξ) +
[
1− µh,t
]
Dξ(pit,u, ξ), (52)
which is bounded over the relevant range for the same reasons as above.
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Second derivative with respect to (t, t). It is equal to:
Dt,t(t, u, ξ) =µ′′h,t
{
D(pi, ξ)−D(pit,u, ξ)−
1− µh,t
1− µh,u
Dpi(pit,u, ξ)
}
+ µ′h,t
µ′h,t
1− µh,t
[
1− µh,u
1− µh,t
]2
Dpipi(pit,u, ξ),
which is bounded over the relevant range for the same reason as above and after noting that µ′h(t)/ [1− µh(t)] =
γ.
Second derivative with respect to (t, u). It is equal to:
Dt,u(t, u, ξ) = −µ′h,tµ′h,u
1− µh,u[
1− µh,t
]2Dpi,pi(pit,u, ξ),
which is bounded over the relevant range for the same reasons as above.
Second derivative with respect to (t, ξ). It is equal to:
Dt,ξ(t, u, ξ) = µ′h,t
{
Dξ(1, ξ)−Dξ(pit,u, ξ)−
1− µh,u
1− µh,t
Dpi,ξ(pit,u, ξ)
}
,
which is bounded over the relevant range for the same reasons as above.
Second derivative with respect to (u, u): Du,u(t, u, ξ).
Du,u(t, u, ξ) = µ′′h,uDpi(pit,u, ξ) + µ′h,u
µ′h,u
1− µh,t
Dpi,pi(pit,u, ξ).
which is bounded over the relevant range since µ′h,u/
[
1− µh,t
]
= γe−γ(u−t).
Second derivative with respect to (u, ξ): Du,ξ(t, u, ξ).
Du,ξ(t, u, ξ) = µ′h,uDpi,ξ(pit,u, ξ),
which is bounded over the relevant range.
Second derivatives with respect to (ξ, ξ): Dξ,ξ(t, u, ξ).
Dξ,ξ = µh,tDξ,ξ(θ, ξ) +
[
1− µh,t
]
Dξ,ξ(pit,u, ξ),
which is bounded over the relevant range.
Dξ(t, u, ξ) is bounded away from zero. This follows directly from the formula for Dξ(t, u, ξ) be-
cause, on the one hand, µh,t ∈ [0, 1] and, on the other hand, Dξ(pi, ξ) is continuous and thus bounded
away from zero over the compact [0, 1]× [ξ, ξ].
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B.1.2 Proof of Lemma 6
First, note that, by an application of the Implicit Function Theorem, the holding cost ξu(ρ) is contin-
uously differentiable, with a derivative that can be written
dξu(ρ)
du
= −Au(ρ) +Bu(ρ)
Cu(ρ)
,
where Au(ρ) = ρD(u, u, ξu(ρ)); Bu(ρ) = e−ρuDu(0, u, ξu(ρ)) +
∫ u
0
ρe−ρ(u−t)Du(t, u, ξu(ρ)) dt;
Cu(ρ) = e
−ρuDξ(0, u, ξu(ρ)) +
∫ u
0
ρe−ρ(u−t)Dξ(t, u, ξu(ρ)) dt.
To obtain the asymptotic behavior of Au(ρ), we apply a second-order Taylor formula:
Au(ρ) =ρ
{
D(u, u, ξ?u) +Dξ(u, u, ξ?u) [ξu − ξ?u] +
Dξξ(u, u, ξˆu(ρ))
2
[ξu − ξ?u]2
}
=ρ
{
Dξ(u, u, ξ?u)
[
1
ρ
Dt(u, u, ξ?u)
Dξ(u, u, ξ?u)
+ oα
(
1
ρ
)]
+
Dξξ(u, u, ξˆu(ρ))
2
[
1
ρ
Dt(u, u, ξ?u)
Dξ(u, u, ξ?u)
+ oα
(
1
ρ
)]2}
=Dt(u, u, ξ?u) + oα(1),
where the second line follows after noting that D(u, u, ξ?u) = 0 by definition of ξ?u and after plugging
in the approximation of Proposition 5.
Turning to Bu(ρ), we first integrate by part to note that:
Bu(ρ) = Du(u, u, ξu(ρ))−
1
ρ
∫ u
0
ρe−ρ(u−t)Du,t(t, u, ξu(ρ)) dt
= Du(u, u, ξu(ρ)) + oα(1),
since, by Lemma 3, D(t, u, ξ) has bounded first and second derivatives. Given that Du(t, u, ξ) has
bounded first derivatives, it is uniformly continuous over ∆ × [ξ, ξ]. Together with the fact that
ξu(ρ) = ξ
?
u + oα(1), this implies that:
Bu(ρ) = Du(u, u, ξ?u) + oα(1).
The same arguments applied to Cu(ρ) show that:
Cu(ρ) = Dξ(u, u, ξ?u) + oα(1).
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Taken together, we obtain that
dξu(ρ)
du
= −Dt(u, u, ξ
?
u) +Du(u, u, ξ?u)
Dξ(u, u, ξ?u)
+ oα(1) =
dξ?u
du
+ oα(1).
B.1.3 Proof of Lemma 7
Since D(pi, ξ) is uniformly continuous over [0, 1] × [ξ, ξ], and since ξu(ρ) = ξ?u + oα(1), it follows that
q`,t,u = q
?
`,t,u + oα(1), and qh,u = q
?
h,u + oα(1). Using the same argument we obtain that:
∂q`,t,u
∂t
= Dpi(pit,u, ξu(ρ))
∂pit,u
∂t
= Dpi(pit,u, ξ
?
u)
∂pit,u
∂t
+ oα(1),
Next:
∂q`,t,u
∂u
= Dpi(pit,u, ξu(ρ))
∂pit,u
∂u
+Dpi(pit,u, ξu(ρ))
dξu(ρ)
du
= Dpi(pit,u, ξ
?
u)
∂pit,u
∂u
+Dξ(pit,u, ξ
?
u)
dξ?u
du
+ oα(1),
using the same argument as above as well as Lemma 6. Lastly,
dqh,u
du
= Dpi(1, ξu(ρ))
dξu(ρ)
du
= Dξ(1, ξ
?
u)
dξ?u
du
+ o(1),
using the same argument as above.
B.1.4 Proof of Lemma 8
One easily verifies that m(0, ε) = 0 and limq→∞m(q, ε) = 1. Clearly, m(q, ε) is continuous over
(q, ε) ∈ [0,∞) × (0,∞), so the only potential difficulty lies in proving continuity at all points (q, 0).
For this consider q ≥ 0 and a sequence (qn, εn)→ (q, 0). We need to show that m(qn, εn)→ min{q, 1}.
If q ≥ 1, the numerator of 1−m(qn, εn) is positive and bounded above by ln(1 + e
−1
1−ε ) which goes to
ln(1 + e−1), and the denominator goes to +∞. Therefore, 1 −m(qn, εn) → 0 and so m(qn, εn) → 1.
Consider now q < 1. For x > 0, let φ(x) ≡ x ln
(
1 + e
1
x
)
and let φ(0) = limx→0+ φ(x) = 1, so that
φ(x) is extended by continuity at 0+. We can then write:
1−m(q, ε) = ϑ(q, ε)φ ◦ ψ(q, ε)
φ(ε)
, where ϑ(q, ε) ≡
(
1− q
1−ε
1− ε
)
and ψ(q, ε) ≡ ε
(
1− q
1−ε
1− ε
)−1
.
Clearly, for q < 1 both ϑ(q, ε) and ψ(q, ε) are continuous at (q, 0), with ϑ(q, 0) = 1−q and ψ(q, 0) = 0.
The function φ(x) is continuous at 0 by construction. It then follows that
1−m(qn, εn)→ 1−m(q, 0) = 1− q.
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Next, consider the first and second derivatives of m(q, ε):
m(q, ε) = 1−
ln
(
1 + e
1
ε
(
1− q1−ε
1−ε
))
ln
(
1 + e
1
ε
) (53)
mq(q, ε) =
1
ε ln
(
1 + e
1
ε
)q−ε e 1ε
(
1− q1−ε
1−ε
)
1 + e
1
ε
(
1− q1−ε
1−ε
) > 0 (54)
mqq(q, ε) =
−1
ε ln
(
1 + e
1
ε
)
εq−(1+ε) e
1
ε
(
1− q1−ε
1−ε
)
1 + e
1
ε
(
1− q1−ε
1−ε
) + q−2ε
ε
e
1
ε
(
1− q1−ε
1−ε
)
(
1 + e
1
ε
(
1− q1−ε
1−ε
))2
 < 0 (55)
Clearly, m(q, ε) is increasing and concave, and three times continuously differentiable over (q, ε) ∈
[0,∞)× (0,∞). The limits of the first and second derivative follow from similar arguments as above.
B.1.5 Proof of Lemma 10
The continuity of Qu is obvious. That Q0 = (s − µh,0)/(1 − µh,0)1+1/σ follows from the definition of
Qu, and QTf = 0 follows by definition of Tf . Next, after taking derivatives with respect to u we find
that sign
[
Q
′
u
]
= sign [Fu], where:
Fu ≡(s− µh,u)
[
(1− µh,0)1+1/σ +
∫ u
0
ρeρt(1− µh,t)1+1/σdt
]
− (1− µh,u)1+1/σ
[
s− µh,0 +
∫ u
0
ρeρt(s− µh,t)dt
]
, (56)
is continuously differentiable. Taking derivatives once more, we find that sign [F ′u] = sign [Gu] where:
Gu ≡−
[
(1− µh,0)1+1/σ +
∫ u
0
ρeρt(1− µh,t)1+1/σdt
]
+
(
1 +
1
σ
)
(1− µh,u)1/σ
[
s− µh,0 +
∫ u
0
ρeρt(s− µh,t)dt
]
, (57)
is continuously differentiable. Now suppose that Q
′
u = 0. Then Fu = 0 and, after substituting (56)
into (57):
Gu =
[
−(1− µh,u)
1+1/σ
s− µh,u
+
(
1 +
1
σ
)
(1− µh,u)1/σ
][
s− µh,0 +
∫ u
0
ρeρt(s− µh,t)dt
]
. (58)
Thus,
R1. Suppose that Fu = 0 for some u ∈ [0, Tf ). Then sign [F ′u] = sign
[
s−µh,u
1−µh,u −
σ
1+σ
]
.
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Now note that G0 = (1− µh,0)1+1/σ
(
1 + 1σ
) (− σ1+σ + s−µh,01−µh,0). Thus,
R2. If
s−µh,0
1−µh,0 ≤
σ
1+σ , then Fu < 0 for all u > 0.
To see this, first note that, from application of the Mean Value Theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 5.11
in Apostol, 1974), it follows that Fu < 0 for small u. Indeed, since F0 = 0, Fu = uF
′
v, for some
v ∈ (0, u). But sign [F ′v] = sign [Gv]. Now, since G0 ≤ 0, Gv is negative as long as u is small enough.
But if Fu is negative for small u, it has to stay negative for all u. Otherwise, it would need to cross
the x-axis from below at some u > 0, which is impossible given Result R1 and the assumption that
s−µh,0
1−µh,0 ≤
σ
1+σ .
R3. If
s−µh,0
1−µh,0 >
σ
1+σ , then Fu > 0 for small u and Fu changes sign only once in the interval (0, Tf ).
Fu > 0 for small u follows from applying the same reasoning as in the above paragraph, since when
s−µh,0
1−µh,0 >
σ
1+σ we have G0 > 0. Since FTs < 0, then Fu must cross zero at least once between 0 and
Ts. The first time Fu crosses zero, it must be from above and hence with a negative slope. Thus, the
expression in Result R1 for the sign of F ′u when Fu = 0 is negative and this expression is decreasing in
u. Therefore, Fu cannot cross zero from below at a later time and hence it only crosses zero once.
B.1.6 Proof of Lemma 12
To prove that Qu is continuously differentiable except in T1 and T2, we apply the Implicit Function
Theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 13.7 in Apostol, 1974). We note that (40) writes K(u,Qu) = 0, where
K(u,Q) ≡
(
(1− µh,0) min{(1− µh,0)1/σQ, 1}+ µh,0 − s
)
+
∫ u
0
ρeρt
(
(1− µh,t) min{(1− µh,t)1/σQ, 1}+ µh,t − s
)
dt. (59)
We consider first the case where Qu > (1 − µh,0)−1/σ for some u. Recall that we defined 0 < T1 <
T2 < Tf such that QT1 = QT2 = (1 − µh,0)−1/σ. Since (1 − µh,0)1/σQu < 1 for u < T1, we restrict
attention to the domain {(u,Q) ∈ R2+ : u < T1 and Q < (1 − µh,0)−1/σ}. In this domain, equation
(59) can be written
K(u,Q) =
(
(1− µh,0)1+1/σQ+ µh,0 − s
)
+
∫ u
0
ρeρt
(
(1− µh,t)1+1/σQ+ µh,t − s
)
dt.
To apply the Implicit Function Theorem, we need to show that K(u,Q) is continuously differentiable.
To see this, first note that the partial derivative of K(u,Q) with respect to u is
∂K
∂u
= ρeρu
(
(1− µh,u)1+1/σQ+ µh,u − s
)
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and is continuous. The partial derivative with respect to Q is
∂K
∂Q
= (1− µh,0)1+1/σ +
∫ u
0
ρeρt
(
1− µh,t
)1+1/σ
dt
and is continuous and strictly positive. Therefore, we can apply the Implicit Function Theorem and
state that
Q′u = −
∂K/∂u
∂K/∂Q
=
ρeρu
(
s− µh,u − (1− µh,u)1+1/σQ
)
(1− µh,0)1+1/σ +
∫ u
0 ρe
ρt
(
1− µh,t
)1+1/σ
dt
.
The same reasoning and expression for Q′u obtain for u > T2, as well as for all u in the case where
Qu ≤ (1− µh,0)−1/σ for all u.
The second domain to consider is {(u,Q) ∈ R2+ : T1 < u < T2 and Q > (1 − µh,0)−1/σ}. In this
domain, equation (59) can be written, using the definition of Ψ(Q),
K(u,Q) =(1− s) +
∫ Ψ(Q)
0
ρeρt(1− s) dt+
∫ u
Ψ(Q)
ρeρt
(
(1− µh,t)1+1/σQ+ µh,t − s
)
dt.
The partial derivative of K(u,Q) with respect to u is
∂K
∂u
= ρeρu
(
(1− µh,u)1+1/σQ+ µh,u − s
)
and is continuous. Noting that Ψ(Q) is differentiable, the partial derivative with respect to Q is
∂K
∂Q
=
∫ u
Ψ(Q)
ρeρt
(
1− µh,t
)1+1/σ
dt
and is continuous since Ψ(Q) is continuous. Moreover, since Ψ(Q) < u in its domain, then ∂K/∂Q > 0.
Therefore, we can apply the Implicit Function Theorem and
Q′u = −
∂K/∂u
∂K/∂Q
=
ρeρu
(
s− µh,u − (1− µh,u)1+1/σQ
)∫ u
ψu
ρeρt
(
1− µh,t
)1+1/σ
dt
,
where we used that ψu ≡ Ψ(Qu).
B.1.7 Proof of Lemma 13
For u ∈ (T1, T2), we have Qu 6= Qu and therefore and therefore Ψ(Qu) = ψu > 0. By definition of ψu,
we also have
Qu = (1− µh,ψu)−1/σ. (60)
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Replacing into equation (42) for Q′u of Lemma 12 , one obtains that:
sign
[
Q′u
]
= sign [Xu] where Xu ≡ s− µh,u − (1− µh,u)
(
1− µh,u
1− µh,ψu
)1/σ
.
As noted above, Qu and thus Xu changes sign at least once over (T1, T2). Now, for any u0 such that
Xu0 = 0, we have Q
′
u0 = 0 and, given (60), ψ
′
u0 = 0. Taking the derivative of Xu at such u0, and using
Xu0 = 0, leads:
sign
[
X ′u0
]
= sign
−1 + (1 + 1
σ
)(
1− µh,u0
1− µh,ψu0
)1/σ = sign [Yu0 ] ,
where Yu ≡ −1 +
(
1 +
1
σ
)
s− µh,u
1− µh,u
,
where the second equality follows by using Xu0 = 0. Now take u0 to be the first time Xu changes
sign during (T1, T2). Since Xu0 = 0, Xu strictly positive to the left of u0, and Xu strictly negative to
the right of u0, we must have that X
′
u0 ≤ 0. Suppose, then, that Xu changes sign once more during
(T1, T2) at some time u1. The same reasoning as before implies that, at u1, X
′
u1 ≥ 0. But this is
impossible since Yu is strictly decreasing.
B.1.8 Proof of Lemma 14
Proof of the limit of Tf (ρ), in equation (43). Recall that Tf (ρ) solves E
[
µh,τu
]
= s and that
Tf (ρ) ≥ Ts. Note also that Pr(τu ≤ t) = min{e−ρ(u−t), 1}. Therefore, a increases in u and ρ induce
first-order stochastic dominance shift. Since µh,t is increasing, it follows that E
[
µh,τu
]
is strictly
increasing in u and ρ, and therefore that Tf (ρ) is strictly decreasing in ρ. Thus, Tf (ρ) admits a limit
Tf (∞) as ρ → ∞. Since Tf (ρ) is greater than the limit, and since E
[
µh,τu
]
is increasing in u, we
have: E
[
µh,τu
] ≤ s for u = Tf (∞). Taking the limit as ρ → ∞ we find that µh,Tf (∞) ≤ s so that
Tf (∞) ≤ Ts. Since Tf (ρ) ≥ Ts, the result follows.
Proof of the first–order expansion, in equation (44). Let
f(t, ρ) ≡ (1− µh,t) min
{
(1− µh,t)1/σQu(ρ), 1
}
+ µh,t − s. (61)
By its definition, Qu(ρ) solves: E [f(τu, ρ)]. Note that, for each ρ, f(t, ρ) is continuously differentiable
with respect to t except at t = ψu(ρ) such that (1− µhψ(ρ))1/σQu(ρ) = 1. Thus, we can integrate the
above by part and obtain:
0 =
∫ u
0
ρe−ρ(u−t)f(t, ρ) dt = f(u, ρ)−
∫ u
0
e−ρ(u−t)ft(t, ρ) dt, (62)
where ft(t, ρ) denotes the partial derivative of f(t, ρ) with respect to t. Now consider a sequence
63
of ρ going to infinity and the associated sequence of Qu(ρ). Because Qu(ρ) is bounded above by
(1 − µh,u)−1/σ, this sequence has at least one accumulation point Qu(∞). Taking the limit in (62)
along a subsequence converging to this accumulation point, we obtain that Qu(∞) solves the equation
(1− µh,u) min{(1− µh,u)1/σQu(∞), 1}+ µh,u − s = 0.
whose unique solution is Qu(∞) = (s− µh,u)/(1− µh,u)1+1/σ. Thus Qu(ρ) has a unique accumulation
point, and therefore converges towards it. To obtain the asymptotic expansion, we proceed with an
additional integration by part in equation (62):
0 =f(u, ρ) +
1
ρ
ft(0, ρ)e
−ρu +
1
ρ
∫ u
0
ftt(t, ρ)e
−ρ(u−t) dt
+
1
ρ
e−ρ(u−ψu(ρ))
[
ft(ψu(ρ)
+, ρ)− ft(ψu(ρ)−, ρ)
]
.
where the term on the second line arises because ft is discontinuous at ψu(ρ). Given that Qu(ρ)
converges and is therefore bounded, the third, fourth and fifth terms on the first line are o(1/ρ). For
the second line we note that, since Qu(ρ) converges to Qu(∞), ψu(ρ) converges to ψu(∞) such that
(1− µhψu(∞))1/σQu(∞) = 1. In particular, one easily verifies that ψu(∞) < u. Therefore e−ρ(u−ψu(ρ))
goes to zero as ρ→∞, so the term on the second line is also o(1/ρ). Taken together, this gives:
0 = f(u, ρ)− 1
ρ
ft(u, ρ) + o
(
1
ρ
)
. (63)
Equation (44) obtains after substituting in the expressions for f(u, ρ) and ft(u, ρ), using that µ
′
h,t =
γ(1− µh,t).
Proof of the convergence of the argmax, in equation (45). First one easily verify that Qu(∞)
is hump–shaped (strictly decreasing) if and only if Qu(ρ) is hump–shaped (strictly decreasing). So if
s−µh,0
1−µh,0 ≤
σ
1+σ , then both Qu(ρ) and Qu(∞) are strictly decreasing, achieve their maximum at u = 0,
and the result follows. Otherwise, if
s−µh,0
1−µh,0 >
σ
1+σ , consider any sequence of ρ going to infinity and
the associated sequence of Tψ(ρ). Since Tψ(ρ) < Tf (ρ) < Tf (0), the sequence of Tψ(ρ) is bounded
and, therefore, it has at least one accumulation point, Tψ(∞). At each point along the sequence, Tψ(ρ)
maximizes Qu(ρ). Using equation (42) to write the corresponding first–order condition, Q
′
Tψ(ρ)
= 0,
we obtain after rearranging that
QTψ(ρ)(ρ) =
s− µh,Tψ(ρ)
1− µh,Tψ(ρ)
= QTψ(ρ)(∞) ≥ QT ∗ψ(ρ).
where T ∗ψ denotes the unique maximizer of Qu(∞). Letting ρ go to infinity on both sides of the
equation, we find
QTψ(∞)(∞) ≥ QT ∗ψ(∞).
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But since T ∗ψ is the unique maximizer of Qu(∞), Tψ(∞) = T ∗ψ. Therefore, Tψ(ρ) has a unique accu-
mulation point, and converges towards it.
B.1.9 Proof of Lemma 15
Given that ∆u = (1− µh,u)1/σQu, we have
∆′u = −
γ
σ
(1− µh,u)1/σQu + (1− µh,u)1/σQ′u.
Using the formula (42) for Q′u, in Lemma 12, we obtain:
sign
[
∆′u
]
= sign
[
−γ
σ
Qu +Q
′
u
]
= sign
[
− γ
σ
Qu
(
I{ψu=0}(1− µh,0)1+1/σ +
∫ u
ψu
ρeρt(1− µh,t)1+1/σ dt
)
+ ρeρu
(
s− µh,u − (1− µh,u)1+1/σQu
)]
. (64)
We first show:
R4. ∆′u < 0 for u close to zero.
To show this result, first note that when u is close to zero, ψu = 0 and, by Lemma 9, Q0 = Q0 =
s−µh,0
1−µh,0)1+1/σ . Plugging in into (64), one obtains
sign
[
∆′0
]
= −γ
σ
(s− µh,0) < 0. (65)
Since ψu = 0 for u close to zero, the results follows by continuity. Next, we show:
R5. Suppose ∆′u0 = 0 for some u0 ∈ (0, Tf ]. Then, ∆u is strictly decreasing at u0.
65
For this we first manipulate (64) as follows:
sign
[
∆′u
]
=sign
[
− γ
σ
∆u
(1− µh,u)1/σ
(
I{ψu=0}(1− µh,0)1+1/σ +
∫ u
ψu
ρeρt(1− µh,t)1+1/σ dt
)
+
ρeρu
(
s− µh,u − (1− µh,u)∆u
) ]
=sign
[
− γ
σ
∆u
(
I{ψu=0}e
−ρu
(
1− µh,0
1− µh,u
)1+1/σ
+
∫ u
ψu
ρe−ρ(u−t)
(
1− µh,t
1− µh,u
)1+1/σ
dt
)
+ ρ
(
s− µh,u
1− µh,u
−∆u
)]
=sign
[
−γ
σ
∆u
(
I{ψu=0}e
[γ(1+ 1σ )−ρ]u +
∫ u
ψu
ρe[γ(1+
1
σ )−ρ](u−t) dt
)
+ ρ (1− (1− s)eγu −∆u)
]
=sign
[
−γ
σ
∆u
(
I{ψu=0}e
[γ(1+ 1σ )−ρ]u +
∫ u−ψu
0
ρe[γ(1+
1
σ )−ρ]t dt
)
+ ρ (1− (1− s)eγu −∆u)
]
and where we obtain the first equality after substituting in the expression for Qu; the second equality
after dividing by (1−µh,u)eρu; the third equality by using the functional form 1−µh,t = (1−µh,0)e−γt;
and the fourth equality by changing variable (x = u− t) in the integral. Now suppose ∆′u = 0 at some
u0. From the above we have:
Hu0 ≡ −
γ
σ
∆u0
(
I{ψu0=0}e
[γ(1+ 1σ )−ρ]u0 +
∫ u0−ψu0
0
ρe[γ(1+
1
σ )−ρ]t dt
)
+ ρ (1− (1− s)eγu0 −∆u0) = 0.
If (1− µh,0)1/σQu0 < 1 then ψu0 = 0 and ψ′u0 = 0. Together with the fact that ∆′u0 = 0, this implies
that
H ′u0 = −
γ
σ
∆u0γ
(
1 +
1
σ
)
e[γ(1+
1
σ )−ρ]u0 − ρ(1− s)γeγu0 < 0.
If (1− µh,0)1/σQu0 = 1, then ψu0 = 0 and the left-derivative ψ′u−0 = 0, so the same calculation implies
that H ′
u−0
< 0. If (1− µh,0)1/σQu0 > 1 we first note that, around u0,
Qu =
(
1− µh,ψu
)−1/σ ⇒ ∆u = (1− µh,ψu
1− µh,u
)1/σ
= e−γ
ψu−u
σ .
So if ∆′u0 = 0, we must have that ψ
′
u0 = 1. Plugging this back into H
′
u0 we obtain that H
′
u0 =
−ρ(1− s)γeγu0 < 0. Lastly, if (1−µh,0)1/σQu0 = 1, then the same calculation leads to ψu+0 = 1 and so
Hu+0
< 0. In all cases, we find that Hu0 has strictly negative left- and right-derivatives when Hu0 = 0.
Thus, whenever it is equal to zero, ∆′u is strictly decreasing. With Result R5 in mind, we then obtain:
R6. ∆′u cannot change sign over (0, Tf ].
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Suppose it did and let u0 be the first time in (0, Tf ] where ∆
′
u changes sign. Because ∆
′
u is
continuous, we have ∆′u0 = 0. But recall that ∆
′
u < 0 for u ' 0, implying that at u = u0, ∆′u crosses
the x-axis from below and is therefore increasing, contradicting Result R5.
B.1.10 Proof of Lemma 16
With known preferences:
J?(s) =
∫ +∞
0
I{u<Ts}e
−ru
(
1− 1− s
1− µh,0
eγu
)σ
du.
Since, by definition eγTs 1−s1−µh,0 = 1, we have that Ts →∞ when s goes to 1, and the integrand of J
?(s)
converges pointwise towards e−ru. Moreover, the integrand is bounded by e−ru. Therefore, by an
application of the Dominated Convergence Theorem, J?(s) goes to
∫ +∞
0 e
−ru du = 1/r when s→ 1.
With preference uncertainty, for u > 0, we note that Qu(s) is an increasing function of s and is
bounded above by (1 − µh,u)−1/σ. Letting s → 1 in the market clearing condition (40) then shows
that Qu → (1 − µh,u)−1/σ > 1. Using that Tf > Ts goes to +∞ when s → 1, we obtain that the
integrand of J(s) goes to e−ru. Moreover, the integrand is bounded by e−ru. Therefore, by dominated
convergence, J(s) goes to 1/r.
B.1.11 Proof of Lemma 17
In the market with continuous updating, we can compute:
J?′(s) =
∫ Ts
0
e−ru
σeγu
1− µh,0
(
1− 1− s
1− µh,0
eγu
)σ−1
du+
∂Ts
∂s
(
1− 1− s
1− µh,0
eγTs
)σ
. (66)
The second term is equal to 0 since eγTs 1−s1−µh,0 = 1. After making the change of variable z = Ts − u,
keeping in mind that eγTs 1−s1−µh,0 = 1, we obtain:
J?′(s) =
∫ Ts
0
e(r−γ)(z−Ts)
σ
1− µh,0
(
1− e−γz)σ−1 dz. (67)
We then compute an approximation of J?′(s) when s→ 1.
When r > γ. In this case we write:
J?′(s) =
∫ Ts/2
0
e(r−γ)(z−Ts)
σ
1− µh,0
(
1− e−γz)σ−1 dz + ∫ Ts
Ts/2
e(r−γ)(z−Ts)
σ
1− µh,0
(
1− e−γz)σ−1 dz.
The first term is less than e−(r−γ)Ts/2 σ1−µh,0
∫ Ts/2
0 [1− e−γz] dz. The integrand goes to 1 as z goes
to infinity and so, by Cesa`ro summation, the integral is equivalent to Ts/2, which is dominated by
e−(r−γ)Ts/2 as s→ 1 and Ts →∞. Thus, the first term converges to zero as s→ 1. The second term
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can be written:
σ
∫ ∞
0
I{u≤Ts/2}e
−(r−γ)u
(
1− 1− s
1− µh,0
eγu
)σ−1
du.
Since Ts goes to infinity when s goes to 1, the integrand goes to , and is bounded by, e
−(r−γ)u(1 −√
1−s
1−µh,0 )
σ−1. Therefore, by dominated convergence, J?′(s) goes to σ(1−µh,0)(r−γ) .
When r = γ. Then we have:
J?′(s) = σ
∫ Ts
0
(
1− e−γz)σ−1 dz.
The integrand goes to 1 when Ts goes to infinity. Thus, the Cesa`ro mean I
′(s)/Ts converges to σ, i.e.:
J?′(s) ∼ σTs = −σ
γ
log
(
1− s
1− µh,0
)
.
When r < γ. In that case:
J?′(s) = σe(γ−r)Ts
∫ +∞
0
I{z<Ts}e
−(γ−r)z (1− e−γz)σ−1 dz,
The integrand in the second line goes to, and is bounded by, e−(γ−r)z(1−e−γz)σ−1, which in integrable.
Therefore, by dominated convergence, the integral goes to
∫ +∞
0 e
−(γ−r)z (1− e−γz)σ−1 dz when s goes
to 1. Finally, using that e−γTs = 1−s1−µh,0 , we obtain:
J?′(s) ∼ σ
(
1− µh,0
1− s
)1−r/γ ∫ +∞
0
e−(γ−r)z
(
1− e−γz)σ−1 dz.
B.1.12 Proof of Lemma 18
Throughout all the proof and the intermediate results therein, we work under the maintained assump-
tion
γ + γ/σ − ρ > 0⇐⇒ γ + σ(γ − ρ) > 0, (68)
which is without loss of generality since we want to compare prices when σ is close to zero. We start
by differentiating J(s):
J ′(s) =
∂Tf
∂s
e−rTf e−γTfQσ
T−f
+
∫ Tf
0
e−rue−γu
∂Qσu
∂s
du >
∫ T2
T1
e−rue−γu
∂Qσu
∂s
du,
where the inequality follows from the following facts: the first term is zero since QT−f
= 0; the integrand
in the second term is positive since Qu is increasing in s by equation (40); and 0 < T1 < T2 < Tf are
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defined as in the paragraph following Lemma 11, as follows. We consider that s is close to 1 so that
Qu > 1 for some u. Then, T1 < T2 are defined as the two solutions of QT1 = QT2 = 1. Note that
T1 and T2 are also the two solutions of QT1 = QT2 . Because both Qu and Qu are hump shaped, we
know that Qu and Qu are strictly greater than one for u ∈ (T1, T2), and less than one otherwise. For
u ∈ (T1, T2), we can define ψu > 0 as in the paragraph following Lemma 11: Qu = (1−µhψu)−1/σ. By
construction, ψu ∈ (0, u), and, as shown in Section B.1.13:
∂ψu
∂s
=
γ + σ(γ − ρ)
γρ
(1− e−ρu) eγu
e−(ρ−γ)(u−ψu) − e−(γ/σ)(u−ψu) . (69)
Plugging Qσu = (1− µhψu)−1 = eγψu in the expression of J ′(s), we obtain:
J ′(s) >
γ + σ(γ − ρ)
ρ
∫ T2
T1
e−ru
(1− e−ρu) eγψu
e−(ρ−γ)(u−ψu) − e−(γ/σ)(u−ψu) du. (70)
When r > γ. For this case fix some u > 0 and pick s close enough to one so that that Qu > 1. Such
s exists since, as argued earlier in Section B.1.10, for all u > 0, Qu → (1− µh,u)−1/σ as s→ 1. Since
the integrand in (70) is strictly positive, we have:
J ′(s) >
γ + σ(γ − ρ)
ρ
∫ u
0
I{u>T1}e
−ru (1− e−ρu) eγψu
e−(ρ−γ)(u−ψu) − e−(γ/σ)(u−ψu) du
>
γ + σ(γ − ρ)
ρ
1
e|ρ−γ|(u−ψu) − e−(γ/σ)(u−ψu)
∫ u
0
I{u>T1}e
−ru (1− e−ρu) eγψu du.
where the second line follows from the fact, proven is Section B.1.13, that u−ψu is strictly increasing
in u when ψu > 0. In Section B.1.13 we also prove that T1 → 0 and that, for all u > 0, ψu → u when
s goes to 1. Therefore, in the above equation, the integral remains bounded away from zero, and the
whole expression goes to infinity.
When r ≤ γ. In this case we make the change of variable z ≡ Ts − u in equation (70) and we use
that e−γTs = 1−s1−µh,0 :
J ′(s) >
γ + σ(γ − ρ)
ρ
∫ Ts−T1
Ts−T2
(
1− s
1− µh,0
) r
γ
erz
(
1− e−ρ(Ts−z)) eγψTs−z
e−(ρ−γ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z) − e−(γ/σ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z) dz
>
γ + σ(γ − ρ)
ρ
∫ +∞
0
I{max{Ts−T2,0}<z<Ts−T1}
(
1− s
1− µh,0
) r
γ
erz
(
1− e−ρ(Ts−z)) eγψTs−z
e−(ρ−γ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z) − e−(γ/σ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z) dz.
where the second line follows from the addition of the max operator in the indicator variable and the
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fact that the integrand is strictly positive. We show in Section B.1.13 that, if ψTs−z > 0, then:
eγψTs−z >

(
γ+σ(γ−ρ)
ρ
) γ
ρ−γ
(
1−s
1−µh,0
)−1
e−γz if ρ 6= γ,
e−(1+σ)
(
1−s
1−µh,0
)−1
e−γz if ρ = γ,
(71)
and: (
e−(ρ−γ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z) − e−(γ/σ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z)
)−1
>
min{γ, ρ}
γ + σ(γ − ρ) . (72)
When γ 6= ρ, we obtain:
J ′(s) >
(
γ + σ(γ − ρ)
ρ
) γ
ρ−γ
min {γ/ρ, 1}
(
1− s
1− µh,0
)−1+ r
γ
×
∫ +∞
0
I{max{Ts−T2,0}<z<Ts−T1}e
−(γ−r)z
(
1− e−ρ(Ts−z)
)
dz. (73)
Consider first the case γ < r. In Section B.1.13 we show that Ts − T2 < 0 when s is close to 1 and
that T1 goes to 0 when s goes to 1. Since Ts goes to infinity, these facts imply that the integrand goes
to, and is bounded above by, e−(γ−r)z when s→ 1. Therefore, by dominated convergence, the integral
goes to 1/(γ − r). A similar computation obtains when γ = ρ.
Consider now the case γ = r. When γ 6= ρ, equation (73) rewrites:
J ′(s) >
(
γ + σ(γ − ρ)
ρ
) γ
ρ−γ
min{γ/ρ, 1}
∫ Ts−T1
max{Ts−T2,0}
(
1− e−ρ(Ts−z)
)
dz
=
(
γ + σ(γ − ρ)
ρ
) γ
ρ−γ
min{γ/ρ, 1}
(
Ts − T1 −max{Ts − T2, 0} − e
−ρT1 − e−ρmin{T2,Ts}
ρ
)
.
Since Ts − T2 < 0 and T1 → 0 when s goes to 1, the last term in large parenthesis is equivalent to
Ts = log((1− s)−1)/γ when s goes to 1. A similar computation obtains when γ = ρ.
B.1.13 Intermediate results for the proofs of Lemma 16, 17 and 18
Derivative of the ψu function when ψu > 0. When ψu > 0, time–τu low–valuation investors
hold qτu,u = 1 if τu < ψu, and qτu,u = (1 − µh,τu)1/σ(1 − µhψu)−1/σ if τu > ψu. The market clearing
condition (40) rewrites:
1− µh,0 +
∫ ψu
0
ρeρt(1− µh,t) dt+
∫ u
ψu
ρeρt(1− (1− µh,0)µh,t)1+1/σ(1− µhψu)−1/σ dt
=s− µh,0 +
∫ u
0
ρeρt(s− µh,t) dt. (74)
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We differentiate this equation with respect to s:
∂ψu
∂s
γ
σ
∫ u
ψu
eρt(1− µh,t)1+1/σ(1− µhψu)−1/σ dt =
∫ u
0
eρt dt.
After computing the integrals and rearranging the terms we obtain equation (69).
Limits of T1 and T2 when s→ 1. For any u > 0, when s is close enough to 1 we have Qu > 1 and
thus T1 < u < T2. Therefore T1 → 0 and T2 → ∞, when s → 1. To obtain that T2 > Ts when s is
close to 1, it suffices to show that QTs > 1 for s close to 1. After computing the integrals in equation
(41) and using that e−γTs = 1−s1−µh,0 , we obtain:
QTs =
Ns
Ds
,
where
Ns =
(1− s)
γ
ρ−γ +
γ
γ−ρ(1− µh,0)
(
1−s
1−µh,0
)ρ/γ
if ρ 6= γ
(1− s) log
(
1−µh,0
1−s
)
if ρ = γ
Ds =
σ(1− µh,0)1+1/σ
γ + σ(γ − ρ)
{
γ
(
1 +
1
σ
)(
1− s
1− µh,0
)ρ/γ
− ρ
(
1− s
1− µh,0
)1+1/σ}
.
When γ ≤ ρ, QTs goes to infinity when s goes to 1. When γ > ρ, QTs goes to γ+σ(γ−ρ)σ(γ−ρ)(1−µh,0)1+1/σ > 1.
Proof that u− ψu is strictly increasing in u when ψu > 0. Rearranging (74), we obtain:
1− s
1− µh,0
eρu =
∫ u
ψu
ρe(ρ−γ)t dt− e γσψu
∫ u
ψu
ρe[ρ−γ(1+
1
σ )]t dt.
When ρ 6= γ, calculating the integrals and reorganizing terms leads to
1− s
1− µh,0
eγu
ρ
=
(
1
ρ− γ +
1
γ
(
1 + 1σ
)− ρ
)(
1− e−(ρ−γ)(u−ψu)
)
− 1
γ
(
1 + 1σ
)− ρ (1− e− γσ (u−ψu)) (75)
Taking the derivative of the right-hand side with respect to u− ψu we easily obtain that it is strictly
increasing in u − ψu, given our parameter restriction that γ > σ(γ − ρ). Since the right-hand side is
strictly increasing in u, then u− ψu is a strictly increasing function of u. When ρ = γ, the left-hand
side stays the same and the right-hand side becomes
u− ψu +
σ
γ
(
e−
γ
σ
(u−ψu) − 1
)
which is strictly increasing in u− ψu as well, implying that u− ψu is a strictly increasing function of
u.
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Proof that ψu → u when s→ 1. As noted earlier in Section B.1.10, for any u, Qu → (1−µh,u)−1/σ
as s→ 1. Together with the defining equation of ψu, Qu = (1−µhψu)1/σ, this implies that ψu → u as
s→ 1.
Proof of equation (71). When γ 6= ρ, we make the change of variable z ≡ Ts − u in the market
clearing condition (75):
e−γz
ρ
=
1
ρ− γ −
(
1
ρ− γ +
1
γ
(
1 + 1σ
)− ρ
)
e−(ρ−γ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z) +
1
γ
(
1 + 1σ
)− ρe− γσ (Ts−z−ψTs−z), (76)
where we have used that e−γTs = 1−s1−µh,0 . This implies that:
e−γz
ρ
>
1
ρ− γ −
(
1
ρ− γ +
1
γ
(
1 + 1σ
)− ρ
)
e−(ρ−γ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z)
=
1
ρ− γ −
γ
σ
(ρ− γ) [γ (1 + 1σ)− ρ]e−(ρ−γ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z)
Using e−γTs = 1−s1−µh,0 and doing some algebra, we arrive at:
ρ
(ρ− γ) [γ (1 + 1σ)− ρ]e(ρ−γ)ψTs−z >
(
1− s
1− µh,0
)− ρ−γ
γ e−(ρ−γ)z
ρ− γ .
Equation (71) for γ 6= ρ follows. Finally, when γ = ρ, the same manipulations lead to:
e−γz = γ
(
Ts − z − ψTs−z
)− σ + σe− γσ (Ts−z−ψTs−z) ⇒ 1 > e−γz > γ(Ts − z − ψTs−z)− σ.
Taking exponentials on both sides, and using e−γTs = 1−s1−µh,0 , lead to equation (71) for γ = ρ.
Proof of equation (72). When γ 6= ρ, we write equation (76) as follows:
1
ρ− γ −
e−γz
ρ
=
(
1
ρ− γ +
1
γ
(
1 + 1σ
)− ρ
)
e−(ρ−γ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z) − 1
γ
(
1 + 1σ
)− ρe− γσ (Ts−z−ψTs−z)
When ρ > γ, we add − 1ρ−γ × e−(γ/σ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z), which is negative, to the right–hand side:
1
ρ− γ −
e−γz
ρ
>
γ
σ
(ρ− γ) [γ (1 + 1σ)− ρ]
(
e−(ρ−γ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z) − e− γσ (Ts−z−ψTs−z)
)
=⇒ 1
ρ− γ >
γ
σ
(ρ− γ) [γ (1 + 1σ)− ρ]
(
e−(ρ−γ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z) − e− γσ (Ts−z−ψTs−z)
)
=⇒
(
e−(ρ−γ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z) − e− γσ (Ts−z−ψTs−z)
)−1
>
γ
γ + σ(γ − ρ) ,
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where we can keep the inequality the same because ρ > γ. Equation (72) when ρ > γ follows.
When ρ < γ, we can also add − 1ρ−γ × e−(γ/σ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z) to the right hand side. But since this
term is now negative, we obtain:
1
ρ− γ −
e−γz
ρ
<
γ
σ
(ρ− γ) [γ (1 + 1σ)− ρ]
(
e−(ρ−γ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z) − e− γσ (Ts−z−ψTs−z)
)
=⇒ 1− e−γz ρ− γ
ρ
>
γ
σ
γ
(
1 + 1σ
)− ρ (e−(ρ−γ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z) − e− γσ (Ts−z−ψTs−z))
=⇒ γ
ρ
>
γ
σ
γ
(
1 + 1σ
)− ρ (e−(ρ−γ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z) − e− γσ (Ts−z−ψTs−z))
=⇒
(
e−(ρ−γ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z) − e− γσ (Ts−z−ψTs−z)
)−1
>
ρ
γ + σ(γ − ρ) .
where we use e−γz < 1 to move from the second to the third line. Equation (72), when ρ > γ, follows.
Finally, when γ = ρ, equation (72) follows since 1− e−(γ/σ)(Ts−z−ψTs−z) < 1.
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B.2 Trading profits
Consider, in the analytical example, a trader who learns at some time T that she has a high valuation.
Assume for simplicity that T < Tf so that the investor find it optimal to hold 1 unit at this time. The
trading profits can be defined as:
Π = −
∫ T
0
ptdqt.
After integrating by part we obtain:
Π = −pT qT + p0s+
∫ T
0
p˙tqt dt = −pt + p0s+
∫ T
0
p˙tqt dt
= −p0 +
∫ T
0
p˙t dt+ p0s+
∫ T
0
p˙tqt dt = −p0(1− s) +
∫ T
0
p˙t [qt − 1] dt.
Now in term of holding plans this can be written:
Π = −p0(1− s) +
∫ T
0
p˙u [q`,τu,u − 1] du < 0.
Note that trading profits are negative. This makes sense because, in this model, every trader who
ends up purchasing before Tf is a net buyer: she starts with s and ends with 1. This is in contrast
with models of liquidity provision, in which trading profits are positive.
Note also that, since traders are net buyers, the best way to minimize cost would be to buy
immediately 1− s at time zero. Of course, although this maximizes trading profits, this strategy does
not maximize inter temporal utility, because it requires the trader to incur large holding costs during
the liquidity shock.
Next, let us calculate the expectations of Π conditional on the event that there are exactly n
updates over [0, T ). For this we need to figure out the distribution of τu conditional on n updates over
[0, T ). Note first that:
Proba(τu ≤ t ∧NT = n) =
n∑
k=0
Proba(Nt = k ∧Nu −Nt = 0 ∧NT −Nu = n− k)
=
n∑
k=0
e−ρt(ρt)k
k!
e−ρ(u−t)
e−ρ(T−u)(ρ(T − u))n−k
(n− k)!
=
e−ρT (ρT )n
n!
n∑
k=0
Ckn
(
t
T
)k (T − u
T
)n−k
= Proba(Nt = n)
[
1− u− t
T
]n
.
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Therefore the distribution of τu conditional on n updates over [0, T ) is
Pr(τu ≤ t |NT = n) =
[
1− u− t
T
]n
.
One sees that an increase in n creates a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution. This
is intuitive: if there has been lots of updates, then it is more likely that the last update before u is close
to u. Combined with the observation that q`,t,u is decreasing in t, this implies that the expectations
of Π conditional on n updates before T is decreasing. This implies that E [Π |n, T ≤ Tf ] is decreasing
in n.
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B.3 Private information about common values reduces trading vol-
ume
In general, private information about common values reduces trading volume, because it generates
adverse selection. Below, we illustrate this point in a noisy rational expectations model, adapted from
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). The main difference is that, while in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)
there are noise traders, in the present case all investors are rational. Trading occurs, in equilibrium,
because of endowment shocks generating potential gains from trade. This is an important difference
for the analysis of trading volume with private information. Since noise traders do not optimize, they
don’t respond to increased adverse selection.
The model. Let us consider a simple version of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). There is one asset
with random payoff v ∼ N (0, 1/Ψv). There are λ informed investors and 1 − λ uninformed ones, all
with Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility, α. Uninformed investors receive no signal and
no endowment. Informed investors observe signal
v +
ε√
Ψε
, (77)
and have random endowment s/λ, where s ∼ N (0, 1/Ψs). As is standard, the common but random
component of the endowment shock prevents uninformed investor from perfectly inferring informed
investors’ information from the asset price. The factor 1/λ keeps the aggregate supply equal to s as
we vary the fraction of informed investors.
Equilibrium. To solve the model, we guess and verify that, to an uninformed investor, the price
is observationally equivalent to a signal of the form:
v +
ε√
Ψε
− s
θ
, (78)
for some θ > 0 to be determined in equilibrium. Note in particular that the coefficient on s is negative:
when they receive a larger endowment, the informed investors want to sell more. This puts downward
pressure on the price. But uninformed investors do not know whether the downward pressure originates
from an endowment shock or from adverse information about v. Thus, they will rationally interpret
this negative price pressure as a noisy signal that the fundamental value has gone down.
Straightforward calculations show that the precision of the price signal, (78) is
Ψp = Ψε
Ψsθ
2
Ψsθ
2 + Ψε
< Ψε.
Clearly, because of the noisy supply, the precision of the price signal, (78), is lower than that of
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informed investors’ signal, (77). The demand of informed and uninformed investors can be written:
DI =
EI [v]− p
αVI [v]
− s
λ
, and DU =
EU [v]− p
αVU [v]
.
Using Bayes’ rule, and keeping in mind that the prior has mean zero, we obtain that the posterior
mean of informed and uninformed investors are
EI [v] =
Ψε
Ψε + Ψv
[
v +
ε√
Ψε
]
, and EU [v] =
Ψp
Ψp + Ψv
[
v +
ε√
Ψε
− s
θ
]
.
The posterior variances of informed and uninformed investors are
VI [v] = (Ψv + Ψε)−1 , and VU [v] = (Ψv + Ψp)−1 .
Therefore, the demand of informed and uninformed investors can be written:
DI =
1
α
[
Ψε
(
v +
ε√
Ψε
)
− (Ψε + Ψv) p
]
− s
λ
DU =
1
α
[
Ψp
(
v +
ε√
Ψε
− s
θ
)
− (Ψp + Ψv) p
]
.
Solving for the price in λDI + (1− λ)DU = 0, we obtain:
p =− αs
λΨε + (1− λ)Ψp + Ψv
+
λΨε
λΨε + (1− λ)Ψp + Ψv
(
v +
ε√
Ψε
)
+
(1− λ)Ψp
λΨε + (1− λ)Ψp + Ψv
(
v +
ε√
Ψε
− s
θ
)
.
After a couple of lines of algebra we see that our guess is verified iff:
θ =
λΨε
α
.
The Volume. The aggregate demand from uninformed investors is
(1− λ)DU = − λ(1− λ)Ψv (Ψε −Ψp)
λΨε + (1− λ)Ψp + Ψs
1
α
{
v +
ε√
Ψε
− s
θ
}
.
Without asymmetric information, it would be equal to (1− λ)s: indeed, the equilibrium allocation in
this case dictates that there is full risk sharing, and hence that all investors, informed and uninformed,
hold s shares of the assets.24
We would like to know whether this trading volume increases or decreases with asymmetric infor-
24Note that with symmetric information, the equilibrium volume is the same regardless of the level of risk (as
long as it is positive). Indeed, with CARA agents, in the setup considered, the equilibrium allocation prescribes
that agents share risk equally, regardless of their (positive) risk aversion and regardless of the level of risk.
77
mation. One sees that there are competing effects. On the one hand, the loading of the order flow,
DU , on s, is equal to
(1− λ)
[
1− Ψp
Ψε
]
Ψv
λΨε + (1− λ)Ψp + Ψv < 1− λ.
That is, asymmetric information reduces the “fundamental” trading volume associated with hedging
needs. For example, suppose that v = ε = 0. Then, when s is positive, the informed investors want to
sell assets, which puts downward pressure on the price. Uninformed investors rationnaly interpret the
low price as a bad signal about the fundamental value of the asset, and reduce their demand relative
to the full information case. In equilibrium, uninformed investors end up purchasing less asset from
informed investors than they would have under symmetric infomaiton.
While there is less trading for fundamental “hedging” motives, there is now some speculative
trading. For example, suppose that v is positive, but ε = s = 0. Then both the informed and
the uninformed investors receive a positive signal about the fundamental value of the asset. But
the informed investor views his signal as more precise: hence, if the uninformed investor demand is
positive, the informed demand will be positive as well. Thus, market clearing implies that the price
must adjust so that uninformed demand must be negative, and informed demand must be positive.
Our main result is that:
Proposition 11. The volume is smaller under asymmetric than under symmetric information:
(1− λ)V [DU ] < 1− λ
Ψs
.
To show this, we start from:
V [DU ] =
(
λ(1− λ)Ψv(Ψp −Ψε)
λΨε + (1− λ)Ψp + Ψv
)2 1
α2
{
1
Ψv
+
1
Ψε
+
1
θ2Ψs
}
.
Substituting in α2 = λ2Ψ2ε/θ
2:
V [DU ] =
(1− λ)2
Ψs
(
Ψv(1−Ψp/Ψε)
λΨε + (1− λ)Ψp + Ψv
)2{θ2Ψs
Ψv
+
θ2Ψs
Ψε
+ 1
}
.
Now using the formula for Ψp we have that θ
2Ψs = Ψp/(1−Ψp/Ψε). Plugging this in we have:
78
V [DU ] =
(1− λ)2
Ψs
(
Ψv(1−Ψp/Ψε)
λΨε + (1− λ)Ψp + Ψv
)2 Ψp(Ψv + Ψε) + ΨvΨε(1−Ψp/Ψε)
ΨvΨε(1−Ψp/Ψε)
=
(1− λ)2
Ψs
Ψv(1−Ψp/Ψε)
(λΨε + (1− λ)Ψp + Ψv)2
(Ψp + Ψv)
=
(1− λ)2
Ψs
× (1−Ψp/Ψε)× Ψv
λΨε + (1− λ)Ψp + Ψε ×
Ψp + Ψv
Ψp + Ψv + λ(Ψε −Ψp)
Clearly, all terms multiplying (1− λ)2/Ψs are less than one, establishing the claim.
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B.4 Information collection effort
In this appendix we study a simple static variant of our model, with three stages: ex-ante banks
choose how much information collection effort to exert, interim banks receive a signal about their
preferences and trade in a centralized market, ex-post banks discover their types and payoffs realize.
In this context, again, we find that the equilibrium is constrained Pareto efficient, i.e., both the choice
of effort, and the allocation coincide with the one that a social planner would choose.
B.4.1 Setup
Consider a continuum of banks with utility v(θ, q) for holding an asset in supply s. Assume bank
type can be either high or low, θ ∈ {θ`, θh} and that the utility function satisfies the same regularity
conditions as in the paper. There are three stages: ex-ante and interim and ex-post. In the first stage
all banks start with endowment equal to s, and they invest in information collection efforts. In the
second stage, banks receive a signal about their type and trade assets in a centralized market. In the
third stage, banks discover their types and payoffs realize.
To model information collection effort, we assume that a bank can choose the probability ρ of
knowing its type for sure. Namely, we assume that a bank observes its type exactly with probability
ρ, i.e., it receives the signal s = h if it has a high type, or s = ` if it has a low type. With the
complementary probability, 1− ρ, the bank observes no signal, which we indicate using the shorthand
s = m. Just as in our main dynamic model, banks who observe s = m face preference uncertainty:
they believe that they have a high type with probability µ, and a low type with probability 1− µ.
Assume for now that all banks choose the same level of effort (we will argue later that this is
without loss of generality). An allocation of asset is a vector {qs}s∈{`,m,h}, prescribing that a bank
who observes signal s ∈ {`,m, h) holds a quantity qs of assets. An allocation is feasible if
ρ [µqh + (1− µ)q`] + (1− ρ)qm = s, (79)
where ρ is the level of effort chosen by banks.
B.4.2 Social planning problem
We define the social planning problem in two steps. First, given any level of effort, ρ, the planner
solves, at the interim stage:
W (ρ) = max
{qs}
ρ [µv(θh, qh) + (1− µ)v(θ`, q`)] + (1− ρ) [µv(θh, qm) + (1− µ)v(θ`, qm)] ,
subject to (79). At the ex-ante stage, the planner solves:
max
ρ∈[0,1]
W (ρ)− C(ρ),
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where C(ρ) is a continuously differentiable and strictly convex function of ρ. Clearly, since W (ρ) is
continuous by the theorem of the maximum, the ex-ante planner’s problem has a solution.
Next, we show that this solution can be characterized by simple first-order conditions. First,
standard arguments show that the interim problem is solved by:
qh = D(1, ξ), q` = D(0, ξ), and qm = D(µ, ξ), (80)
where D(µ, ξ) is a demand function defined exactly as in the main body of the paper, and ξ solves:
ρ [µD(1, ξ) + (1− µ)D(0, ξ)] + (1− ρ)D(µ, ξ) = s. (81)
Now consider W (ρ), the social value of choosing effort, at the ex-ante stage. Our main result is:
Proposition 12. The planner’s problem is solved by the unique ρ? such that
W ′(ρ?) ≤ 0 if ρ? = 0,W ′(ρ?) = 0 if ρ? ∈ (0, 1), and W ′(ρ?) ≥ 0 if ρ? = 1, (82)
where
W ′(ρ) = [µv(θh, qh) + (1− µ)v(θ`, q`)]− [µv(θh, qm) + (1− µ)v(θ`, qm)] (83)
− ξ [µqh + (1− µ)q` − qm] ,
and {qs} and ξ jointly solve (80) and (81) given ρ.
The expression for W ′(ρ) is obtained by an application of the envelope theorem. Clearly, condition
(83) is necessary for optimality. To show uniqueness and sufficiency, we take another round of derivative
to obtain that:
W ′′(ρ) = −dξ
dρ
[µqh + (1− µ)q` − qm] = [µqh + (1− µ)q` − qm]
2
ρ [µDξ(1, ξ) + (1− µ)Dξ(0, ξ)] + (1− ρ)Dξ(µ, ξ) < 0.
In the above, the first equality follows because, when {qs} are given by (79), then marginal utilities
are equal to ξ. The second equality follows by calculating dξ/dρ explicitly using the implicit function
theorem.
Finally, we argue that our restriction that banks choose the same level of effort is without loss of
generality. Notice indeed that, with heterogeneous ρ, the social welfare in the interim stage, W , only
depends on the average ρ. Given convexity of the cost function, the planner strictly prefers to have
all banks choose a common level of effort.
B.4.3 Equilibrium
We now study the equilibrium choice of information collection effort and show that it coincides with
the social optimum. Suppose that other banks exert a level of information collection effort equal to
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ρ¯. As in the paper, the interim equilibrium is socially optimal given ρ¯. This implies that the interim
equilibrium price is the unique solution ξ¯ of (81), and the asset holdings are given by (80). Ex-ante,
each individual bank chooses its level of information collection effort, ρ, taking as given the information
collection of others, ρ¯, which determines the interim equilibrium price, ξ¯. To an individual bank, the
value of choosing ρ is:
V (ρ | ξ¯) = max
{qs}
ρ [µv(θh, qh) + (1− µ)v(θ`, q`)] + (1− ρ) [µv(θh, qm) + (1− µ)v(θ`, qm)]
− ξ¯ {ρ [µqh + (1− µ)q`] + (1− ρ)qm} .
A bank’s ex-ante effort choice problem is:
max
ρ∈[0,1]
V (ρ | ξ¯)− C(ρ).
An ex-ante equilibrium is defined as a pair (ρ¯, ξ¯) such that: (i) ξ¯ is an interim equilibrium price given
ρ¯, and (ii) ρ¯ solves the bank’s ex-ante effort choice problem given ξ¯. Our main result is:
Proposition 13. There exists a unique ex-ante equilibrium. In this equilibrium, bank’s effort collection
choice is socially optimal, i.e., ρ¯ = ρ?.
To show this proposition, we first use the envelope theorem to assert that:
V ′(ρ | ξ¯) = [µv(θh, qh) + (1− µ)v(θ`, q`)]− [µv(θh, qm) + (1− µ)v(θ`, qm)]
− ξ¯ {µqh + (1− µ)q` − qm} ,
where {qs} solves (80) given ξ¯. Since {qs} only depend on ξ¯, which a bank takes as given, we have
that V ′′(ρ | ξ¯) = 0. Since the cost function C(ρ) is strictly convex, it thus follows that the ex-ante
effort choice problem is strictly concave, and its solution is uniquely characterized by the first-order
condition. Clearly, one sees that the equilibrium condition coincides with the optimality condition of
the planning problem.
Notice again that we need not worry about asymmetric equilibria in which banks choose heteroge-
nous levels of efforts: given the price that will prevail at the interim stage, a bank’s effort choice
problem is strictly concave, so it has a unique maximizer.
To illustrate the proposition we consider the following numerical example. We use iso-elastic
preferences v(θ, q) = θq1−σ/(1 − σ), and we set σ = 0.5, s = 0.5, θh = 1, and θ` = 0.1. We assume
that µ = 0.5 and that the cost of effort is:
C(ρ) = c
ρ1+γ
1 + γ
,
where γ = 0.1 and the constant c is chosen so that the planner’s problem is maximized at ρ? = 0.5.
In Figure 6, the social value of information collection effort, W (ρ) − C(ρ), is shown as the plain red
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Figure 6: The social value (plain red) and private value
(dashed blue) of information collection effort.
curve. The individual bank’s private value of recovery effort given the equilibrium price ξ? generated
by ρ?, V (ρ |ξ?) − C(ρ), is the dashed blue curve. One sees that the social value of effort differs from
the social value. In particular, the social value is more concave than the private value: this is because
the planner’s value takes into account the impact of changing ρ on the (shadow) price of the asset,
ξ, while an individual bank does not. However, one sees that the envelope theorem ensures that the
private and social value coincide and are tangent to each other at ρ = ρ?.
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B.5 Finite number of traders
In this appendix we offer some numerical calculations of an equilibrium when there is a finite number of
traders, with and without preference uncertainty. We describe the evolution of traders’ asset holdings
and of the holding cost. Our calculations reveal that our main excess volume result continues to
hold when there is a finite number of traders. In addition, since idiosyncratic preference shocks and
updating times no longer average out, the model features a new source of holding cost volatility. Our
calculations suggests that, relative to the known preference case with the same finite number of traders,
preference uncertainty tends to mitigate this new source of volatility.
We consider a finite number N of traders but otherwise keep the model exactly as in the text. In
particular, we continue to assume that traders behave competitively, as price takers. Studying price
impact, along the line of Vayanos (1999) or Rostek and Weretka (2011) would introduce additional
technical difficulties that go beyond the main objective of this appendix. Under price taking, the
demand of trader i ∈ {1, . . . , N} at time u remains equal to D(piτ iu,u, ξu), where τ iu denotes the last
updating time of trader i ∈ {1, . . . , N} before the current time, u. What is different is the market
clearing condition, which becomes:
1
N
N∑
i=1
D(piτ iu,u, ξu) = s.
One sees that, each trader’s updating time before recovery becomes an aggregate shock: it changes
that trader’s demand and thus moves the price discretely.
Figure 7 shows the equilibrium holdings along a particular sample path of preference shocks and
updating times. The number of traders is set to N = 5 and otherwise the parameters are the same
as in our main parametric calculations. Equilibrium objects under preference uncertainty and known
preferences are depicted by plain blue lines and dashed red lines, respectively. One sees clearly from
the figure that the updating times of others become aggregate shocks and cause every trader to change
its holdings. This is an additional source of trading volume, above and beyond the one identified in
the continuum-of-traders case.
Figure 8 shows the cumulative volume along this particular sample path of shocks (left panel),
as well as the average volume across 10, 000 sample paths (right panel). Both figures indicate that,
just as in our main model, cumulative volume is larger with preference uncertainty than with known
preferences.
Figure 9 shows the holding cost for the same particular sample path of shocks (left panel) as well as
the average holding cost across 10,000 sample paths of shocks. One sees clearly from both panels that
preference uncertainty tends to raise the holding cost at the inception of the liquidity shock, because
traders who still have a low valuation believe they may have switched to a high valuation. One also
sees that the full recovery is delayed, as traders need to wait for an updating time before being certain
that they have a high valuation.
Finally, one may wonder what is the impact of having a finite number of traders on holding cost
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Figure 7: Holdings of 5 traders along a sample path of
shocks, for known preferences (dashed red) vs. uncertain pref-
erences (plain blue).
volatility, with and without preference uncertainty. One sees intuitively that, with known preferences,
there are larger upward changes in holding costs. With preference uncertainty, there are many small
changes in holding costs, upward and downward. Figure 10 confirms this observation by calculating
the volatility of the percentage difference between the holding cost and the average holding cost across
10,000 simulations. The volatility with known preferences is higher, and peaks sooner, reflecting the
large change in holding cost arising when sufficiently many traders have switched to high.
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Figure 8: Cumulative trading volume along a sample path
of shocks (left panel) and average cumulative trading volume
across 10,000 sample paths of shocks, for known preferences
(dashed red) vs. uncertain preferences (plain blue).
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Figure 9: Holding cost along a sample path of shocks (left
panel) and average holding cost across 10,000 sample paths
of shocks, for known preferences (dashed red) vs. uncertain
preferences (plain blue).
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Figure 10: Volatility of holding costs across 10,000 sam-
ple paths of shocks, for known preferences (dashed red) vs.
uncertain preferences (plain blue).
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